| The continuous development of market economy promote the business size of company, under the situation of two rights separation along with the enterprise system development, the principal-agent problem has become a enduring theme in the way of exploring the corporate governance structure. In order to ease the information asymmetry phenomenon leading to by the principal-agent relationship, and reduce the agency cost, the shareholders sign compensation contracts with the agents so that the interests of both of principals and agents can be balanced. Executives as the entrusted part in the compensation contracts, own a certain degree of power and position, their level of compensation and the standard of compensation establishment have attracted people’s attention for a long time. Facing with the executives’huge compensation be exposured by the media frequently, we begin to consider what kind of compensation contract is effective, and how to improve the connection degree between executive compensation and the companies’ performance.The new accounting standards implemented in 2007 is a major reform in the history of accounting development, not only achieved the convergence with international financial reporting standards in essence, making Chinese accounting standards recognized by the world, but also improved the degree of standardization during the process of listed company’s accounting process, and enhanced the quality of accounting information in the aspect about correlation and usefulness. As the direct reflection of accounting information, the scientific degree about performance indicators’ measurement has improved along with the better accounting information, it can calculate the operating results more accurately, and then reflect the executives’ effort level more real, so the companies’ business performance has become more reliable for the smooth implementation of compensation contracts.This paper take the influence of Accounting standards reform to the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts as main content, to research whether the reform can improve the company’s compensation-accounting performance sensitivity and compensation-market performance sensitivity or not. The theory of optimal compensation contracts thinks that reasonable executive compensation should be a present increasing function with business performance. The compensation will increase along with performance rising, and decrease at the opposite situation. However, in the listed company of our country, executive compensation present viscous phenomenon. Considering the asymmetric between executive reward and punishment, we will also explore the influence that the accounting reform has taken to compensation viscous.Firstly, the paper will analyze some theory related to executive compensation, evaluate the result that the accounting reform caused for company, market and stakeholders, then propose hypothesis based on the analysis. Choose the A-share listed companies as sample, the dependent variable select executive compensation, and take the accounting performance, market performance and the accounting reform as independent variables, also make sure the control variables be included, using them to constitute a regression analysis model.As for the executive compensation viscous, take the net profit on behalf of accounting performance. The data result show that, executive compensation appears positive correlation with both accounting performance and market performance, and the accounting reform has not only promoted the correlation, but also weaken the compensation viscous phenomenon. Therefore, through analyzing the optimistic result, we will find new idea to make the compensation contracts perfect, at the same time, the research also confirm the positive effect of the accounting reform from the contract perspective. |
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