| In this paper, we first study the strategies of insider trading with risk-averse or risk-seeking when market makers observe some incomplete information in a risk asset market. Then we discuss the existence of strategies of insider trading in a Cournot game and a Stackelberg game between two insiders, respectively. The full text is divided into three chapters.In the first chapter, we introduce some basic concepts of conditional probability and related properties. In addition, we also introduce a basic model of insider trading.The second chapter studies the characteristic of insider trading when market maker receive an incomplete signal, including the characteristic of strategies of insider trading with risk-averse and with risk-seeking. It shows that when the observed signal is same as that of Gong and Zhou(2010) model, or Xiao and Zhou(2013)model, the expected profit, trading intensity and market liquidity are all relatively smaller; but the amount of information released by the insider is unchanged.The third chapter studies the existence of equilibria in a Cournot game and a Stackelberg game between two insiders when they receive an incomplete signal, respectively. It shows that there is no Cournot equilibrium; But there is a unique Stackelberg equilibrium. And we also give the form of Stackelberg equilibrium,which extends the result of Gong and Zhou(2013).The last is the summary and prospect of future work. |
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