Research On The Optimal Information Disclosure Policy In Multi-attribute Reverse Auctions

With the rapid development of e-commerce, online reverse auctions has become a new procurement tool, which not only can expand the scope of supplier selection but also reduce the cost greatly, improve the efficiency, and bring more gains for both parties. As a result, more and more companies have started to use this technology for global purchasing. How to disclose information disclosure to influence the behavior and benefits for both sides has become a hot issue in recent years. The main purpose of this article is to explore the optimal information disclosure policy in different phases of multi-attribute reverse auctions. We use the simulation experiment to validate and complement the conclusions of model derivation, and explore the management strategies of information disclosure based on the conclusions.This study is divided into two stages of before and after real-time quote. Before the real-time quote, first of all, we calculate the equilibrium of the supplier whether to disclose true information and the buyer whether to verify the information by establishing the game model, then we give different coping strategies for both sides under different situations and supply management advice on both sides in order to promote the honest trade. Secondly, we calculate and analyze buyer’s utility under suppliers’ quality attribute value disclosure or not. After real-time quote, we analyze the effects of suppliers’ quotes complete disclosure and incomplete disclosure for buyer and suppliers by establishing the dynamic game based on the Bertrand model, and graphical interface is obtained by MATLAB7.0 software. And then, a simulation experiment site is developed to simulate the process of auction under different information disclosure policies, and we collect and analyze the experimental data in order to validate and complement the conclusions of model derivation. Finally, we put forward advice on information disclosure effective from buyer and suppliers’ views.Findings indicated that:(1) Before real-time quote, improving the verification efficiency, increasing the intensity of punishment, reducing verification cost and suppliers’ additional benefits when they disclose false information, etc can promote suppliers to disclose true information and reduce buyer verification. Buyer should disclose information when the distribution of suppliers’ quality attribute values is not uniform, otherwise not disclose it.(2) After real-time quote, it is better to use complete information disclosure policy in general, but when the quality attributes of the first round winner is significantly dominant or not optimal, buyer should choose incomplete information disclosure policy. The effects of information disclosure policies are different for the suppliers with different attribute levels, which can cause different strategies for suppliers.(3) In order to promote honest trade and disclose information effectively, buyer should guide correctly, establish reward and punishment mechanism, increase his strength, improve the standard of entry, and use corresponding information disclosure policy flexibly according to specific situations. Suppliers should tell the truth, improve quality attributes, compete rationally, etc.