The Study On The Influence Of The Large Shareholder’s Control Right On The Investment Efficiency Of The Enterprise

The behavior of controlling shareholders’ interests is not only a problem of global corporate governance, but also the focus of the current China. Company management practice. Under the special governance environment of China’s transition economy, the major shareholder of the state-owned holding company and the family holding company, which has the right to control the small and medium shareholders and the public interest in the process of pursuing controlling interests, may be in the process of pursuing controlling interests. Pyramid stock ownership and other ways to achieve the separation of the two, the controlling shareholder of the Target Corp can be less cash flow control, and then control the board of directors and the company has a major decision-making. With the existence of asymmetric information, the controlling shareholder can make non efficiency investment through capital, related transaction, transfer assets, etc., and occupy the interests of small and medium shareholders to obtain control right. On the basis of previous studies, this paper analyzes the dynamic mechanism of the formation of the control right of the large shareholders, based on the overall analysis paradigm of "motivation, behavior and performance". From the perspective of subject behavior, the paper focuses on the study of controlling shareholder’s control, and puts forward the mathematical model of the control right, and puts forward the research hypothesis. Finally, based on the 2008-2013, the 4818 panel data of the listing Corporation are the empirical test. The main conclusions are as follows:Firstly, based on the theory of principal agent theory and control theory, the dynamic analysis is made on the formation of control right. The right of control is the premise of the formation of control right. The separation of the two rights is the incentive of the formation of control right.Second, based on the analysis of the main behavior of the control right, this research constructs the mathematical model of the control right of the enterprise’s investment efficiency, and deduces that the investment scale is an increasing function of the controlling shareholder’s personal gain. With the increase of the control right, the investment level of the listing Corporation is improved with the increase of the cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders, the investment level of the listing Corporation is reduced. And with the increase of the intensity of supervision, the cost of acquiring control rights is rising, the investment level of the listing Corporation will be reduced.Third, the empirical test results show that the existence of control right has brought some of the enterprises’ over investment, but also inhibits the investment of some enterprises, so it has two sides. The proportion of the first major shareholder and the governance of the board of directors of the board of directors has been confirmed, which can weaken the relationship between the control right and the non efficiency investment. The governance role of the equity checks and balances has not been confirmed. The possible reason is that the daily management of the enterprises controlled by the controlling shareholder is in the hands of the large shareholders and the management of their interests. The separation between Chairman and general manager can weaken the relationship between the control right and the non efficiency investment. It can restrain the investment of the enterprise, but it can promote the over investment of the enterprises. Increasing the proportion of independent directors can restrain the investment of enterprises in a certain extent, but the relationship between the interests and the non efficiency investment is contrary to expectations, which shows that the current independent directors can not only play the role of governance, but also become a tool for controlling the interests of the controlling shareholders.