Studies On Major Shareholder Controlling And Its Effect On Corporate Governance Of Private-listed Company

By summarizing the current studies and expounding the essence about the effects on corporate governance of the company's ownership-centralizing, this paper puts forward theoretical framework the two kinds of problems of corporate governance, on which the whole paper is based on. Furthermore, from different points of view, his paper makes a deep analysis on the two kinds of problems of corporate governance, the effects on corporate governance and its mechanism of the company's major shareholder-controlling private-listed companies. The whole paper the following three aspects: First, two kinds of problems on corporate governance private-listed companies is demonstrates. We find that for major shareholder-controlled companies, the solution to the first governance problem is not to cut down the agent cost, but to introduce professional managers and deputies. As for the second governance problem, it is not to eliminate the excessive separation between ownership and domination, but to pay more attention to the diversification of shareholders of the private-listed companies. Second, the effects on corporate governance of company's major shareholder-controlling in private-listed companies is studied. We find our private-listed companies'mechanism of corporate governance is conducted only as a matter of form, which performs practically no function and doesn't stimulate the inner managers of the companies. By comparison, we find the biggest shareholder is of great importance. The market value (Tobin's Q) of private-listed companies and the shares taken by the biggest shareholder forms "U"relationship. Third, the relationships between the mechanism of major shareholder-controlling and other mechanisms of corporate governance are studied. We find that there is no difference in the variant determination coefficient by using the path model or the regression model. But the effect of the major shareholder-controlling mechanism is negative, which partly disagrees with the results of single factor regression model; and that major shareholder-controlled mechanism should work directly. The effects of the mechanism of major shareholder-controlling are mostly derectly, the inderect effects which resulted in the interaction with other mechanisms is still not optimistic. As a whole, In order to develop private-listed companies, first, mechanisms in corporate governance should be set up and standardized, which can bring their function into full play. Then, private-listed companies should overcome the limitations of family-controlling, realize their organizing development, managing specialization and introducing specialized managers. Last, private-listed companies must take correct measures to minimize the negative influence of the major shareholder.