| The separate of ownership and the right of management in modern enterprise, made owners just retain ownership, gave the right of management to operators, and lead to form a principal-agent relationship between the owners and operators. Due to information asymmetry and different interests target between the owners and operators, Operators is likely to use decision-making rights to infringe upon the interests of the owner for their own interests, resulting in agency problem and increasing agency cost. So in order to minimize agency costs and control the behavior of operators, the owners need to sign a contract of compensation and performance with operators. With the occurring of "Sky-high compensation" and "Salary limit" in recent years, it indicated pay linked to performance is not equal. The effectiveness of compensation contract has been questioned. For improving the effectiveness of compensation contract and solving agency problem, many scholars at home and abroad gave their views on corporate governance structure. Executives are the main decision maker in the company. They can operated the company’s performance and the development prospect of the company. So improving corporate governance structure and offering restriction and stimulation at the same time.Based on the principal-agent theory and incentive theory, combined our country’s economic environment and system background, this article deeply researched the State-owned listed companies corporate governance structure’s impact on executive compensation and the pay-performance sensitivity. In the study design, we used 6269 A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2014 annual report data as sample, the companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange. By using descriptive statistics and multivariate linear regression analysis method, we studied how corporate governance structure (ownership structure, board characteristics and characteristics of the board of supervisors) effects executive pay and performance sensitivity.In the concrete research, this article chose 8 industries (that is Mining industry, Manufacturing industry, Electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply industry, Construction industry, Wholesale and retail industry, Transportation, warehousing and postal service industry, Financial industry and Real estate industry) to do industry grouping test, made the results more targeted. The research finds out, the selection of 8 industry state-owned listed companies, ownership concentration and the proportion of executives shareholding impact on executive compensation and pay-performance sensitivity is consistent, namely, the high ownership concentration can reduce executive compensation, improve pay-performance sensitivity; The high proportion of executive shareholding can improve executive compensation, reduce pay-performance sensitivity. And the other variables in the governance structure impact on executive compensation and the pay-performance sensitivity exist certain differences in various industries. Specific research conclusion is as follows:(1) In Mining industry, Manufacturing industry, Wholesale and retail industry and Real estate industry, ownership concentration has significant negative correlation with top executive compensation, and significant positive correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; In Electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply industry, ownership concentration has significant positive correlation with top executive compensation, but no significant relationship with pay-performance sensitivity; In Construction industry, ownership concentration has no significant relationship with top executive compensation, but significant positive correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; In Transportation, warehousing and postal service industry and Financial industry, ownership concentration has no significant relationship with top executive compensation and pay-performance sensitivity; (2) In Wholesale and retail industry, Transportation, warehousing and postal service industry, Real estate industry, the proportion of executives shareholding has significant positive correlation with top executive compensation, and has significant negative correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; In Mining industry and Construction industry, the proportion of executives shareholding has significant positive correlation with top executive compensation, but has no significant correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; In Manufacturing industry, Electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply industry, the proportion of executives shareholding has no significant correlation with top executive compensation, but has significant negative correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; (3) In Manufacturing industry and Real estate industry, The joining together of two position has significant positive correlation with top executive compensation, and has significant negative correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; In Electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply industry, The joining together of two position has significant positive correlation with top executive compensation, but has no significant correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; But in Construction industry, The joining together of two position has significant negative correlation with top executive compensation, and has significant positive correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; In Mining industry, Wholesale and retail industry, Transportation, warehousing and postal service industry, The joining together of two position has no correlation with top executive compensation and pay-performance sensitivity; In Financial industry, The joining together of two position has significant negative correlation with top executive compensation, but has no correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; (4) In Manufacturing industry, the proportion of independent directors has significant positive correlation with top executive compensation, and significant negative correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; In Transportation, warehousing and postal service industry, Real estate industry, the proportion of independent directors has significant negative correlation with top executive compensation, and significant positive correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; In Mining industry, Electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply industry, the proportion of independent directors has significant positive correlation with top executive compensation, but has no significant correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; In Financial industry, the proportion of independent directors has no significant correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; (5) In Mining industry, Manufacturing industry, Wholesale and retail industry, Transportation, warehousing and postal service industry, Real estate industry, the scale of supervisory board has significant negative correlation with top executive compensation, but has no significant correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; In Financial industry, the scale of supervisory board has significant positive correlation with top executive compensation, and has significant negative correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; In Construction industry, the scale of supervisory board has no significant correlation with top executive compensation, but has significant positive correlation with pay-performance sensitivity; In Electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply industry, the scale of supervisory board has no significant correlation with top executive compensation and pay-performance sensitivity;According to the research conclusion, this article from the perspective of perfecting the corporate governance structure and improve the pay-performance sensitivity, put forward the following Suggestions:Choose the joining together of two position carefully, Continue to improve the independent director system, continue to improve the executive compensation incentive system and perfect the compensation disclosure system. Finally, the article puts forward the shortcomings existing in the research. |
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