| The study on the relationship between ownership characteristics and corporate performance always has been concerned as the core issue in the field of corporate governance. But for the ownership concentration has been proved to be common by many scholars, the research focus of corporate governance has been followed to change gradually from the separation of managerial authority to the separation of cash flow controlling rights. The ownership concentration, or so-called’only one big share’is the significant feature of listed companies in China, The expropriating and tunneling phenomena that the majority shareholders caused have occurred from time to time. The Growth Enterprise Market, the so called cradle of hatching high-tech and innovative enterprises, has experienced a brief boom of three high phenomenon. But in recent years, many GEM listed companies whose large shareholders have been reduced holding cash, and it has made enterprise performance declining. This problem caused widespread concern and research from academia and super intendency.Based on the free cash flow constraint perspective, this paper take the evoked motivation and the supervision mechanism of actual controller behavior as the research object, select 1146 samples from China’s GEM listed companies during 2010-2014.First,study chooses 9 performance indicators to calculate the explained variables by using factor analysis method, which can reflect the companies’overall performance level better; secondly, study uses independent samples T test, Pearson correlation test and multiple regression analysis method to measure the relationship between the two-right-separation and the performance of GEM listed corporations. The results show that:(1) If the actual controllers of the GEM listed companies were consistent with their founders, this situation will enhance the positive’incentive effect’of corporate performance by cash flow rights; (2) The concentrated control is of great advantages for GEM listed companies which are at the start up stage and the growing stage. The superiority, for example the high effectiveness of decisions and the right opportunity-seizing, is bigger than the inferiority, just like the entrenchment effect and so on. (3)The entrenchment effect caused by two-right-separation also exists in the GEM listed companies; (4)The behavior that actual controllers obtaining private benefits from expropriation, is significantly restrained by the free cash flow adequacy in GEM listed companies. According to these conclusions, this study put forward four specific recommendations are as follows: the GEM IPO access mechanism, the free cash flow constraint mechanism, the supervision of secondary market and internal governance mechanism, These suggestions aim at strengthening the constraint of actual controllers’behavior for seeking private benefit of control, and protecting the legitimate interests of minority investors in China’s capital market.The research’s value lies in using the factor analysis method to measure the level of overall performance, optimizing the method of measuring corporate performance index; and based on the life-cycle perspective of life cycle proposing the idea that the GEM initial stock equity should be arranged before IPO to realize the corporate governance mode’s changing plan. The obtained conclusion has the certain enlighten function regarding the management level of GEM listed enterprises. |
