Decision And Coordination Models Of Supply Chain Under Fairness Preference And Risk-averse Based On The Sale Effort

This topic will combine the two aspects of asymmetric information and market disturbance, which discuss the disturbance of CSR supply chain under asymmetric information market. First we establish a CSR optimal decision model of supply chain under asymmetric information, then introducing market disturbance impact on CSR supply chain of each decision variable. Respectively in retailers engaged in CSR and manufacturers involved in CSR discuss the optimal decision of the asymmetric information market disturbances. This topic will explore market disturbance to the influence of supply chain under asymmetric information, which provides reference for the emergency supply chain operation, when making relevant strategy of the enterprise it has important guiding significance.(1) The two-stage Stackelberg game supply chain consists of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. Under asymmetric information, the paper studies optimal decisions for the retailer and the manufacturer of supply chain involving in CSR activities, which introduce consumer surplus as a profit function of their participation. Firstly, the effect of the market potential mean ea and activity input coefficients for the retail price, the wholesale price, the market demand, the retailer profit, the manufacturer profit and system total profit are discussed under the retailers involved in CSR activities. Moreover, the optimal activity input coefficient a for the biggest system total profit is analyzed at different range of the market potential mean ea. Then under the manufacturer involved in CSR activities, this paper investigates the effect of the market potential mean ea and the CSR activity input coefficient am for the decision variables above. Also the optimal activity input coefficient a*m for the biggest system total profit is analyzed at different range of the market potential mean ea. Finally, the conclusions are verified biographical simulations.(2) The market size and production cost under asymmetric information disturbance problems are studied and the optimal decision of manufacturers involved in supply chain retailers, which participate in corporate social responsibility (CSR) at the same time. Based on consumer surplus profit function of retailers and manufacturers participate in the activities of CSR, and discusses the activity into coefficient in both cases the impact on the optimal decision variables. Then the market disturbance classification discussed by each decision variable in the supply chain and the optimal profit. The graphic simulation verified the influence of various factors and the robustness of the optimal decision variables and the activities of CSR into coefficient’s impact on profits.