Dual-channel Supply Chain Optimal Strategies Considering Behaviors Of Members

In recent years, the dual-channel operating mode has been the main sale way which is adopted by more and more brand manufacturers. Due to the establishment of new direct channels, not only vertical competition exists in traditional channels between the manufacturer and the retailer, but also horizontal competition arises between the traditional retail channel and the network channel. The fierce competition and the uncertainty in demand may induce the supply chain members to show fairness concern and risk-averse behaviors. Unlike the hypothesis in most traditional literatures in which supply chain members are perfect rationality, in this dissertation, we introduce the behavior factors of supply chain members into dual-channel supply chains and study the decision strategies and supply chain coordination mechanism. Obviously, the problems discussed in this dissertation are more nearly to real application, the theory level and application level of problems in supply chain management literature have been improved. The conclusions of the research provide effective and significant theoretical references and evidences for the decision-making of supply chain optimization and supply chain coordination.The main research work includes several aspects listed as follows:Firstly, we consider a dual-channel supply chain system constituted by a manufacturer and an independent retailer. The retailer provides value-added services to consumers. At the same time, the retailer shows fairness concern behavior. We use Stackelberg game theory to establish mathematical model and obtain the equilibriums. Research has found that the entire supply chain cannot be coordinated with a constant wholesale price under the situation that the retailer provides value-added service for consumers and has fairness concern behavior.Secondly, for the moment, consumers firstly go to the physical store to experience service based on the above background, and then transfer to the network channel to place orders, we design two kinds of scenarios and solve the corresponding equilibrium solutions. Through the analysis of the solutions, we explore that how the service cooperation contract which is beneficial to two partners should be signed between the supply chain members, and how the experience-centric service influence the pricing decisions and the profits of two members, even the profit of the whole supply chain.Thirdly, based on the background that the manufacturer introduces a direct channel, we consider that the information of market size is asymmetric. Assume that the retailer has the ability to analyze the fluctuations and predict the changes of the market size more accurately. However, in order to cope with the manufacturer encroachment and protect his own benefit, the retailer may purposely distort the order quantity downward to induce the manufacturer to make mistakes when judging the true market size. We adopt the mean-variance method to measure the retailer’s risk-averse behavior, and establish game model to certify the existence of a unique Bayes equilibrium solution. We solve a threshold which should be setted in order to ensure that the manufacturer may judge accurately the true market size. In addition, we solve the retailer’s optimal order quantity and the optimal direct selling quantity which make the profit or utility of the supply chain members obtain the corresponding optimal results.Finally, we study a dynamic dual-channel supply chain constructed by a manufacturer and an independent retailer. To promote sales, the manufacturer invests in national advertising and the retailer promotes the goodwill through local advertisement. We compare the equilibrium solutions and profits under the single channel and dual-channel supply chain system. We analyze the changes in profits of both partners after the manufacturer introduces the network channel, and then design a two-way revenue sharing contract to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain.