Study On Incentive Mechanism And Cooperation Mechanism Of A Third Party Participation In Pollution Control

Environmental problems are very serious,constantly disturbing national economic development and the health of residents.How to effectively control environmental pollution is a problem in society.In this paper,we study the problems of pollution control in the traditional model,finding that there exist some problems,such as rent-seeking,corruption,unprofessional technology for remedying environmental pollution.And these problems lead to low efficiency of pollution control.Under the background of advocating public participation of pollution control,we study cooperation mechanism of local government,the public,and pollution emission firm to provide theoretical foundation of supporting the third party participation governance.First,we study the current situation,participation ways,and necessity of a third party participation in pollution control.In recent years,it has been supported by the law and policy in our country.According to present situation of system of a third party participation in pollution control,this paper further analyzes the participation ways including capital investment,letters and visits,supervise and lawsuit,and so on.It is necessary not only in the aspect of policy and law,also in the economic view.Economic theory confirmed that it is an effective way to solve the environment pollution externalities if making the cost of the pollution treatment endogenous the pollution control mode in the traditional model trends to form rent-seeking,corruption,and lead to "tragedy of common".But the principle of a third party participation in pollution control is "damage means liability",and the cost of pollution treatment is included in the utility function of polluters,which can avoid "tragedy of common".Hence,a third party participation in pollution control is necessary.Second,we try to discuss the incentive mechanism of the third party participation in pollution control.Traditional research stimulates a third party to participate in pollution control mainly from legal system,which can't motivate them from inside.To motivate them,we study the evolutionary character of the third party,and describe the cognitive bias of the third party.Then we study the factors affecting the point of the third party.This paper considered the effect of the cognitive deviation of participants,loss aversion and other psychological characteristics on the enthusiasm of a third party,and we set up an differential system about the guiding effect and the number of accepting pollution control by the third party,and we confirmed that the view of the third party can be changed according to its evolutionary character,and adverse effect from cognitive bias can also be avoid.And then we established the incentive mechanism based on dispatching of rights and obligations about environment pollution control,in which the value of emission permits can quantify the liability and contribution of the third party more accurately,and it can overcome the problem of shortage of the inner motive power due to the loss aversion to participate in pollution control.Third,we discuss the cooperation among local government,a third party,and pollution emission enterprise and the allocation of interests in order to match the contribution to the coalition with the interests they achieve.Traditional research has failed to solve the problem of the third party continuing to participate in pollution control.In realistic cases,random factors such as human factors or natural disasters may lead to the failure of cooperation.This paper describes the dynamic change of the state of cooperation in random environment and established pollution control model of cooperation.And we use quantitative research methods to discuss the influencing factor of earnings of the third party.Supervising from the member of the coalition urges them to try their best to eliminate pollution.Then we compared the income return in the situation of cooperation and noncooperation,finding that the income in the situation of cooperation is higher due to synergistic effect.Finally,this paper established the distribution of interests to satisfy a subgame consistency and allocated the income of cooperation to the third party according to the model of cooperation and dynamic shapley value,and proved that the distribution can reach the equilibrium of the cooperation,which ensured the third party not to deviate from the target of environmental pollution control.In conclusion,the incentive mechanism can promote the third party to participate in pollution control,and the mediation from the local government can urge the game between a third party and the local government to reach equilibrium.And the local government can also guide the third party according to the character to insure the third party participation orderly.The mechanism can not only overcome the disadvantage in traditional mode but also reducing environmental pollution effectively.