Evolutionary Game Analysis Of Mass Events Of Environmental Pollution

With the acceleration of industrialization and urbanization,environmental pollution is becoming increasingly serious,resulting in a blowout type growth trend of mass incidents,which has become a serious constraint on economic development and social harmony and stability.To explore the evolution mechanism of mass events of environmental pollution,discover its evolution law,and put forward effective control strategies are of great significance for preventing environmental pollution mass events and avoiding the deterioration of environmental pollution mass events.Based on the literature review and found the actual problems,extracted mass events of environmental pollution divided into the four important problems with or without government involvement in evolution mechanism for the study of the main line,using research methods,to explore how to solve the existing mass events of environmental pollution,four important problems and corresponding solution is given.The main research work of this thesis is as follows:(1)Since environmental pollution mass events face different management problems at different stages of development,if only one stage is considered separately,it may lead to one-sided decision-making and cannot completely solve environmental pollution mass events.Therefore,it is necessary to study environmental pollution mass events from the perspective of the whole life cycle.Therefore,based on the whole life cycle theory,from the time dimension,according to the nature and characteristics of different stages,environmental pollution mass events can be divided into three stages:supervision in advance,control in the event and compensation afterwards.In this thesis,the staged game model of mass events of environmental pollution in different development stages is firstly constructed.The prisoner's dilemma model is used to depict the public supervising and reporting the environmental illegal behaviors of enterprises in the pre-supervision stage.The gender war model depicts the coordinated actions of surrounding masses and enterprises in the control stage to promote the enterprises to achieve green transformation.The chicken game model depicts the reconciliation strategy between the surrounding people and the enterprise in the compensation stage.Then,from the perspective of the whole life cycle of environmental pollution group events,the equilibrium path between surrounding people and enterprises is analyzed by using dynamic game theory,and the key factors affecting the equilibrium path are analyzed,and the conditions for realizing the ideal equilibrium path are given.It provides reference for the government to formulate appropriate regulation policies according to the nature and characteristics of different stages.(2)It is clearly stated in the 14th Five-Year Plan and the outline of the Vision for 2035 that green rivers and lush mountains are invaluable assets and promote all-round green transformation in economic and social development.And "carbon peak","carbon neutral"target proposed,heavy chemical and other high pollution enterprises green transformation brings great pressure.At the same time,A variety of complex external random factors,such as the COVID-19 pandemic and China-USA trade friction,have added many uncertainties to the green transformation of enterprises.How do these random factors affect enterprise strategy selection?How can enterprises successfully achieve green transformation under highly uncertain conditions?What factors will affect enterprises' green transformation decisions?This is the focus of this study.Moran process based on this,this thesis built the stochastic evolutionary game model,discuss the expected return dominate the leading two kinds of random factors and the situation of enterprise strategy evolution tendency,analyzes the two kinds of situations the conditions of the enterprises to choose the green technology innovation strategy,given the heavy chemical industry can achieve the largest enterprise group size of green transformation,And compare the largest enterprise group size of heavy chemical industry to achieve green transformation under the two scenarios.Some suggestions are put forward to promote green transformation management in heavy chemical enterprises.It provides theoretical guidance for traditional heavy chemical enterprises to carry out green technology innovation to achieve green transformation and avoid mass events of environmental pollution.At the same time,the green transformation of other industries has a certain reference significance.In addition,it will also contribute to the rapid realization of "carbon peak" and "carbon neutral" goals.(3)Under the economic new normal,the government is faced with a dilemma between environmental protection and stable growth and employment.If the government implements strict environmental regulation policies and increases the intensity of environmental regulation,enterprises are likely to go bankrupt.On the contrary,it is easy to lead to ineffective government regulation.The government needs environmental protection,steady growth and jobs.What is the intensity of the government's effective environmental regulation?How can the government achieve both environmental protection and stable growth and employment?Based on this,this thesis constructed the surroundings and the spontaneous evolutionary game model,and then build around the masses and enterprises under the government's environmental regulation of controlled evolutionary game model,discussed the surroundings and enterprises under the government regulation of controlled evolutionary game process,analysis of the implementation of environmental protection and steady growth,the effective government environmental regulation range of the win-win,It provides a useful reference for the government to achieve a win-win situation of environmental protection and steady growth and employment.(4)In the evolution process of environmental pollution mass events,the protest mass strategy will be affected by internal factors such as irrational emotions,as well as various uncertain factors outside the system such as government disposal plans.How will these random factors affect the protest crowd's choice of strategy?How does the government effectively resolve mass events of environmental pollution?These problems are the focus of this thesis.Based on this,this thesis construct the Moran process model for the resolution of environmental pollution mass events,and gave the fixed probability of surrounding people's continued protest strategy and exit protest strategy.On this basis,the influence of evolutionary selection intensity on the resolution mechanism of environmental pollution mass events was further analyzed.In these two scenarios,the maximum number of mass events of environmental pollution that can be effectively resolved and the establishment conditions for the exit protest strategy to become an evolutionary stable strategy are given respectively.This thesis provides a new theoretical explanation based on stochastic evolutionary game to reveal the resolving mechanism of environmental pollution mass events,and provide rich management inspiration for local government to effectively resolve environmental pollution mass events.