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Game And Econometric Analysis On Transaction Price And Compliance Supervision Of Carbon Trading Market

Posted on:2018-10-27Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L HuangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2321330515995277Subject:Quantitative Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Developing carbon emissions trading not only conforms to the overall requirements of China to deepen the reform of the economic system,but also the main measure to achieve the total control and peak target of greenhouse gas emissions in China.Based on systematic analysis of the transactions of each carbon trading pilot in China,this paper finds that the market activity and compliance rate is at a relatively low level,as well as the transaction price is generally low but with volatility.On the one hand,the perfect compliance supervision mechanism is conducive to improving the compliance rate,enhancing the carbon market activity,effectively playing the market mechanism of price formation function,so that the carbon trading price maintains at a more rational and stable level.On the other hand,the steady price will reduce the risk of carbon trading,help to improve market activity,thereby improving the compliance rate.Therefore,this paper combines the carbon trading compliance supervision mechanism with the transaction price mechanism to conduct analysis,has theoretical and practical significance through the analysis of the corresponding improvement proposals.The main contents of this paper are as follows:Firstly,through the collection and processing of data,this paper carries out systematic analysis of the transactions of each carbon trading pilot in China during 2016,and finds out the existing problems in compliance supervision mechanism and transaction price mechanism,which are interrelated with each other.Secondly,in view of the imperfect supervision mechanism and compliance rate,this paper establishes the evolutionary game model of carbon market compliance supervision system.Through the analysis of the replication dynamic equation,it can be learned that gradually increasing the cost of punishment for the default of the companies,while increasing the welfare benefits of their performance,and increasing the punishment of poor supervision,in the longterm evolution,it will eventually make the compliance mechanism to perfect equilibrium results.Thirdly,in view of the problem that the price of carbon transaction in China is generally low,based on the VAR model,this paper takes the carbon transaction price of Shenzhen pilot as the research object,and deduces the relationship between domestic carbon price and foreign carbon price,domestic and international economic situation and so on.Through analyzing the influence process and influence degree of each factor on China's carbon price,it is concluded that China's carbon transaction price is relatively close to the EU but not yet connected with it.Finally,policy recommendations are made on the existing problems in the carbon trading market,in order to promote the establishment of national unified carbon trading market.
Keywords/Search Tags:Carbon trading market, Evolutionary game theory, Vector autoregression
PDF Full Text Request
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