Research On Two-way Coopetition And Low Carbon Equilibrium In Inland Port And Seaport

With the rapid growth of economy,more and more countries have begun to pay attention to the construction of inland ports.Nowadays,the rapid development of inland ports has caused fierce competition between inland ports and seaports for sourcing within the scope of common radiation,even vicious competition has occurred,the disorderly competition between inland ports and seaports will cause waste of resources and regional chaos,and will affect the long-term development of the entire region.Therefore,based on the perspective of both inland ports and seaports,this paper will conduct in-depth studies on the economic equilibrium and low-carbon balance of inland ports and seaports,and provide decision-making references for port and port-affiliated city governments in formulating port development strategies and improving port management operations,which is of great practical significance.Based on the summarization of the coopetition between seaports and the equilibrium of supply chain,the Stackelberger game model is applied to construct a two-layer dynamic game model of local government-port operators,Super-network and Variational Inequality Theory are applied to construct Supply Chain Network Model.Then use theoretical derivation and Matlab programming to obtain an equilibrium solution,the solution and analysis of the examples prove the scientificity and feasibility of the method.Finally,the sensitivity analysis of the parameters in the model is carried out to sort out the relationship among decision-makers,and provide a theoretical basis for the development of the port.The main conclusions of the article are as follows:1)In terms of the port services level,the government's choice of cooperation will not necessarily reduce the service level of the port;when it comes to the port,when the local government and the port operator choose the?competition-competition?framework,the inland port service level reaches the lowest of the four mode,and the service level of the seaport is not necessarily lowest;2)Local government's?port operator's?choice of cooperation can improve the total profits of government?port operator??Local governments and port operators both want the other party to choose a competitive model to increase their desire for cooperation;3)The increase of unit carbon emission cost does not necessarily lead to a decrease of traffic in the total supply chain network,but it will cause the transfer of volume from higher carbon emissions ports to lower carbon emissions ports,then achieve the effect of improving the environment.4)The trade and transport network between the manufacturer and the port are very little influenced by the change of carbon emission coefficient of the manufacturer(?_{m 1}??_m2)and the carbon emission coefficient of the retailer(?_{r 1}??_r2);The increase of raw material conversion rate?and port carbon emission coefficient?_p1 will both reduce the transport service volume of the seaports,on the contrary,the increase of the unit carbon emission cost?and the port carbon emission coefficient?_p2 will both reduce the volume of transport in the ports.