From Representative Content To Hyle:the Evolution Of Husserl's Concept Of Sensantion

The evolution of Edmurd Husserl's concept of sensation is what this thesis want to investigate into.Specifically,this process is from representative content to hyle.The phase of it refers mainly to thirteen years from the publication of logzical investigations(1900)to that of Idea 1(1913).The concept of hyle first debuted in Idea 1,which is intended to critically reshape the old view of 'representative content'called in logical investigations(more precisely,sensation).In the case of traditional empiricists,the concept of sensation has been exhaustively explored.They believed that the object of human thought(consciousness)is idea or sensation.Sense-datas are supposed to be both 'really inherent' in the flow of consciousness and objects of awareness.According to this view,people do not have intentionality.Their lives formed only by the replacement of a variety of sensations.Brentano,on the other hand,'discovered' the intentionality.He pointed out that psychological phenomena have the characteristics of pointing to objects or intrinsic objects,and thus distinguish them from physical objects.But traditional empiricists and Brentano have made the same mistake.They did not distinguish between the psychological content of consciousness and the object to which the consciousness is intended-representative content and intentional object.Contrary to them,Husserl rationally distinguished between representative content and intentional object,and then put forward his own model of 'apprehensional content-apprehension'.Apprehensional content or representative content refers to those data who do not have intentionality.Only through the process of objectification-given the material or meaning,they can make the intentional 'stand up'.Different types of consciousness acts have different representational contents.For example,signification has non-genuine representative content but intuitive act has genuine.In addition,signification can obtain its genuine representative content or fullness from the intuitive act.When the fullness reaches its optimal condition,the object itself is fully revealed and thus we reach the highest ideal of fullfilling-adequate perception.But in the case of adequate perception,representative content is the same thing as intentional object.That is to say,adequate perception does not follow the model of apprehension.In addition,Husserl,in the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time,discovered the triple horizons of internal time consciousness--'original impression-retention-protention'.He pointed out that,in the field of internal time consciousness,the consciousness of retention has its own unique intentionality,but this intentionality can not be explained by the 'model of apprehension'.Therefore,he put forward that '…not every construction has model of apprehensional content-apprehension',thus accomplished the rejection of this model in the field of internal time consciousness.More importantly,by studying the triple horizons of internal time consciousness,Husserl discovered a vast area of the phenomenological study-the stream of consciousness or the pure consciousness.This discovery enabled him to turn from descriptive psychology to transcendental phenomenology.In an essential analysis of pure consciousness acquired through a transcendental reduction,Husserl distinguished two structural factors-intention activity and intention-related terms,subordinate to each intentional experience.All intentional activities have two different factors:the non-intentional factors as the material and the intentional factors.Husserl used an ancient Greek word 'Hyle' to mean the non-intentional sense-data in the analysis of the Noesis-Noema,in order to distinguish it from the non-intentional representational content described in logical investigations.