Beyond The Distinction Of Inner/Outer—Objections To The Internalist And Externalist Interpretations Of Husserl’s Phenomenology

The internalism-externalism debate has been popular among recent years.The relationship between this debate and Husserl’s Phenomenology has also aroused scholars’ attention:does Husserl’s Phenomenology belong to the position of internalism or externalism?My viewpoint is that the presupposition of the internalism-externalism debete,i.e.the "distinction of inner/outer",cannot be simply applied to Husserl’s Phenomenology,and we need to reconsider this distinction under Phenomenological attitude.Chapter one of my thesis gives a brief introduction to the background of the internalism-externalism debate,as well as a summary of the viewpoints of several scholars.Chapter two focuses on the concept of noema in Husserl’s Phenomenology,introducing a Fregean-internalism interpretation of Husserl’s Phenomenology,of which the main idea is:the noema is an intensional entity and it serves as a mediator,providing the content of consciousness with directness toward objects.This chapter discusses the definitions and relations of noema,meaning,object,content and the determinable X,and finally argues that the noema should be understood as the object after the phenomenological reduction,rather than an intensional entity.Thus,it will bring forward a critique of such an internal ism interpretation.Chapter three discusses the Cartesian-internalism interpretation of Husserl’s Phenomenology.The key point of this kind of interpretation is that,Husserl’s Phenomenology,especially after phenomenological reduction,abandons external and real objects and the world,and turn to study the content inside the consciousness,and relies solely on such content to determine the directness of intentionality.I give some examples of some scholars who believe that the epoche and phenomenological reduction of Husserl is methodological solipsism.Then I move on to demonstrate the Cartesian way of phenomenological reduction,in order to avoid it to be misunderstood as going back to an isolated mind on the one hand,and to show how the Cartesian way of phenomenological reduction is improper on the other hand.After the phenomenological reduction extends itself from an "empty" pure consciousness to transcendental realm of experience,I argue that the study of "content" of the consciousness does not mean internalism.Chapter four shows the debate between A.D.Smith and Hansberger.A.D.Smith argues that Husserl’s Phenomenology is disjunctivism-externalism because both emphasize that the perception and the hallucination are different in kind.If the object is real,the system of experience which the object corresponds to is perception,otherwise it is hallucination.Hansberger argues that,A.D.Smith misunderstands the harmony of the system of experience,the determinable X and its relationship with the system of experience.It seems that A.D.Smith thinks an external real object is in advance given to the system of experience and thereby determining its harmony.I give some analyses about this critique.Then I discuss Searle’s refutation of the twin earth thought experiment,Husserl’s own version of twin earth thought experiment and the thought experiment provided by Wenzel.I argue that motivating and horizon are important for intentionality,and that the horizon serves as the foundation of all kinds of manifestation.We can only acknowledge externality with respect to the real(reell)content,but in the sense of the horizon,there is nothing external to it.To conclude,phenomenological attitude is in principle against the distinction of inner/outer.From the position of phenomenological reduction,the distinction between mind and world itself is constituted by the realm of transcendental experience.Therefore,Husserl’s Phenomenology is neither internalism nor externalism.