The Assumption Of 'Amorlaist'—A Challenge Of Motivational Internalism

The debate between Motivational Internalism and Motivational Externalism is a central issue of debates within contemporary meta-ethics.The focus of dispute is whether the relationship between moral judgment and moral motivation is internal or external,is necessary or contingent.To put it simply,the internalist think that the moral motivation is internal to the moral judgment and there is a necessary connection between motivation and moral judgment.And in contrast,the externalist argues that the connection between motivation and moral judgment is external and contingent.In order to counter the view of internalism and defend their own position,the assumption of 'amoralist' has been put forward by the externalist.They deem that the'amoralist'-the man who makes genuine moral judgment which leave him indifferent and he has no motivation is indeed conceivable and possible.Some philosopher insist that this people not only can be imaginable,but also exist in our actual world.Internalism will be wrong if the 'amoralist' is conceivable,even if it cannot be found in our real world.Internalists have two main ways to response the challenge of'amoralism':one is represented by Hare,which insist that amoralist does not make the genuine moral judgment;the other one is represented by Smith,which insist that amoralists are not practically rational,so they try to make moral judgment but fail.After examine their process of argumentation and a tentative analysis of the source of conflict between Internalism and Externalism,we hold that internalists did not solve the challenge of 'Amoralism'.