Incentive Mechanisms Based On Supply-demand Relationship In Wireless Networks

This thesis designs reasonable utility functions and pricing functions based on Economics and Game Theory and establishes the incentive mechanism based on supply-demand relationship.Besides,the incentive mechanism prevents the participators from giving false feedbacks to get benefits and effectively controls their strategic behaviors.What's more,it is applied in wireless opportunistic networks and crowd sensing.In this thesis,we analyze several classical routing protocols and corresponding routing performance in wireless opportunistic networks.Then,two incentive compatible copy distribution methods based on supply and demand relationship in wireless opportunistic networks are proposed.They are single copy distribution method and multiple copy distribution method.We introduce the pricing function of copy.It has been proved that the proposed routing methods are incentive compatible.Our methods effectively improve the sending ratio and reduce the average delay of data transmission.Mobile crowd sensing has become an efficient paradigm for performing large scale sensing tasks.An incentive mechanism is important for the mobile crowd sensing system to stimulate participants,and to achieve good service quality.In this thesis,the platform and the users of the mobile crowd sensing are regarded as the demanders and suppliers of resources.We design the incentive mechanisms for mobile crowd sensing,where the price and supply of the resource contributed by the smartphone users are determined by the supply-demand relationship of market.We present two models of mobile crowd sensing: the resource model and the budget model.In the resource model,each sensing task has the least resource demand.In the budget model,each task has a budget constraint.We design an incentive mechanism for each of the two models.Through both rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive simulations,we demonstrate that the proposed incentive mechanisms achieve computational efficiency,profitability,individual rationality,and truthfulness.Moreover,the designed mechanisms can satisfy the properties of non-monopoly and constant discount under certain conditions.