Research On The Corporate Governance Of China’s Listed Commercial Banks And Comprehensive Performance

Banks as the core and the pillar of the modern financial system, plays an important role in a country’s economy, its comprehensive performance level concerns the stability and development of the country and the world economy at a certain extent. Corporate governance of commercial bank, as the core of modern bank system, its quality directly affects bank’s comprehensive level of performance level. Good Corporate governance mechanism of commercial bank is the basis for maintaining the public’s trust, is the fundamental for keeping sustainable competitiveness of commercial banks, is the key to the stable operation of the banking industry. Based on this, this paper takes 2012 year’s data of China’s 16 listed commercial banks as samples, studies the corporate governance of China’s listed commercial banks and comprehensive performance. First of all, this paper combined with the particularities of corporate governance of commercial bank, analyzed the theory related to and comprehensive performance, laid a solid foundation for the full text. Secondly, expounded and analyzed the process and current situation of the corporate governance of the commercial banks in China, in order to supplement and mapping the following empirical analysis. Then, using Principal component analysis method to construct the comprehensive performance index of China’s listed commercial banks, overall measure the levels of comprehensive performance of China’s listed commercial banks, and empirical analyzed the corporate governance and the comprehensive performance of China’s listed commercial banks. Finally, summarized the full text, and offered suggestions on optimization for corporate governance of China’s listed commercial banks.Through theoretical and empirical analysis, the paper drew the following conclusions:(1) the ownership of commercial bank in China is relatively concentrated, the proportion of the first shareholder is negatively correlated with the comprehensive performance of commercial bank; (2) the influence of the first shareholders’s state-owned nature is not significant; (3) the sum of the top five shareholders’shareholding have a significant negative impact on comprehensive performance of listed commercial banks; (4) the Board size have significant negative correlation with the comprehensive performance of listed commercial banks; (5) board meetings convened and the number of the board of supervisors’ meetings have stimulative effect on the comprehensive performance of listed commercial banks in a certain extent; (6)the proportion of independent directors have a positive effect on the comprehensive performance of listed commercial banks; (7)expansion of the Board of supervisors can not promote the comprehensive performance of listed commercial banks; (8) executives incentive systems did not produce a positive motivational impact on the comprehensive performance of Listed commercial bank in china.