Research On Impact Factors Of Executive Compensation Based On Listed Bank Dividends

With the deepening of the reform of listed commercial Banks in China, the principal-agent problems in the management for commercial Banks, especially the principal-agent problem between shareholders and executives to gradually become a hot research topic. Based on discussing the influence factors of the listed banks executive pay and the correlation between bank dividends and executive pay, this dissertation analyzes the principal-agent problem in commercial Banks governance from a new perspective. Bank dividends and executive compensation represent the interests of the shareholders and managers of the bank respectively. The principal-agent problem is to realize win-win situation of interest between shareholders and executives. At the same time, bank bonuses can effectively supervise the behavior of the executive. Therefore, researching on factors of executive compensation and studying the relationship between bank dividends and executives for executives in the equity concentration of listed commercial Banks are important for analyzing and solving the principal-agent problems between shareholders and executives.In this dissertation, adopting the combination of theoretical research and empirical research method, we use the game analysis model for the conclusion that there is a bank shareholders and senior executives of interests equilibrium, namely, there is a Nash equilibrium. The balance of the interests of both sides by executives and shareholders is to maximize shareholder interests and supervise the action of strategy. Selecting 16 commercial Banks which have been listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange as the research object, we explain the current situation of banks bonuses and executive pay through the relevant data from 2010 to 2014. At the same time, we establish the panel data regression model to research on factors of executive compensation and verify the relationship between dividends and executive pay of listed commercial banks. The empirical results show that: executive pay has a positive correlation relationship with bank performance and bank size, a negative correlation with equity concentration; there is no relationship between the influence of bank dividends and executive pay in the state-owned banks and joint-stock banks, but a positive relationship in city commercial banks. The reasons that there is no relationship between the influence of bank dividends and executive pay may be in three points: firstly, executive compensation system of the listed banks is imperfect; secondly, shareholders equity concentration which damages the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders seriously; finally three is the deficiency in the system of listed banks share out bonus. To some extent, this shows existing serious principal-agent problems in the listed banks.According to the result of empirical study, this dissertation puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations in order to alleviate the principal-agent problem in listed commercial Banks. Firstly, China should standardize the system of the executive compensation of listed commercial banks, including establishing scientific and reasonable compensation evaluation system, improving the mechanism of punishment and executive compensation disclosure, perfecting the pay structure and increasing the long-term incentive compensation structure; secondly, standardize equity concentration and the establishment of bank internal supervision mechanism; finally, standard listed commercial banks share out bonus system, including improving the management idea of listed commercial banks and strengthening market supervision laws and regulations.