The Reform Of Non-tradable Shares Can Reduces Tunneling From Controlling Shareholders To Listed Companies

In this paper, we study whether the tunneling from big shareholders to the listed company reduced systematically in the situation that large shareholders of listed companies can enter the secondary market to sell their shares(in general non-tradable shares before the reform) after the reform of non-tradable shares.The meaning of this article is that we study the listed companies governance improvement through the reform of non-tradable shares from two viewpoint, one is the relationship of related party transactions with the wealth of minority shareholders, the other is the relationship of related party transactions with the sustainable development capacity of the company.Through this research, we can analyze whether institutional changes like the reform of non-tradable shares can improve the living atmosphere of listed companies and bring benefits to minority shareholders. At the same time, we can also provide certain information for policy makers to judge whether the reform of non-tradable shares reached their expectations.