Study On The Influence Of Corporate Governance Mechanism To Inefficient Investment Behavior Under Life Cycle Perspective

Along with China's economic development into the new normal,Chinese enterprises will also face new opportunities and challenges,how to improve the efficiency of the enterprise investment behavior has become a key link in the process of enterprise transformation.It is a pity that inefficient investment behavior is more and more common with company's development,ownership and managerial authority's separation and the emergence of agency,financing constraints and information asymmetry.In order to restrain inefficient investment behavior,public companies are establishing a series of corporate governance system.For example,public companies are adjusting the equity structure of listed companies,enhancing supervision of the board of directors and establishing incentive mechanism.In addition,the enterprises'formation,development,maturity and decline have a living part of the process of the form.In the different stages of life cycle,enterprises have operating conditions,organizational structure and internal and external environment.They face have different agency costs,financing constraints and degree of information asymmetry,so corporate governance mechanism will have had different effects on the efficiency of investment behavior.In this view,this paper uses the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies from 2011 to 2013 in our country.At the same time,this paper combines theoretical analysis with empirical research and analyzes along with asking questions-literature review-theory analysis-empirical test-conclusions and policy recommendations.In terms of theory,this paper uses the information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory,capital investment theory and life cycle theory to explain the motivation of inefficient investment behavior and the influence of corporate governance mechanism on inefficient investment behavior in different stages of life cycle.In the empirical test,this paper uses Richardson model's residual to measure the inefficient investment behavior.If residual is greater than 0,the investment behavior is excessive.If residual is less than 0,investment behavior is lack.Through principal component analysis,corporate governance mechanism of 13 variables can be divided into supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism.Reference to Anthony and Ramesh's classification method of life cycle,the enterprise life cycle is divided into growth,maturity and decline.This paper studies mechanism and incentive mechanism for the influence of inefficient investment behavior.This paper combines the theoretical analysis and empirical test and gets the following conclusion.First,the inefficient investment behavior is common in the listed companies in our country,and underinvestment problem is more common,overinvestment problem is more serious.The efficiency of investment behavior will change as the change of enterprise life cycle.Second,supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism are able to inhibit the inefficient investment behavior,but the inhibitory effect on overinvestment behavior is more significant.Third,the supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism have different influences on inefficient investment behavior in the different stages of enterprise life cycle.In samples of over-investment,supervision mechanism in the growing period and mature period can effectively inhibit the excessive investment behavior,but the effect of governance in the mature period is better.Incentive mechanism in the growing period and mature period can effectively inhibit the excessive investment behavior,but the effect of governance in the growing period is better.Supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism in recessionary period can't effectively restrain the excessive investment behavior.In samples of under-investment,supervision mechanism in the mature period and recessionary period can effectively inhibit the lack investment behavior.Incentive mechanism in mature period and recessionary period can effectively restrain the lack investment behavior,the effect of governance in the mature period is better.But supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism in growing period can't effectively restrain the lack investment behavior.In addition,dovish model test results are consistent with this study.The last,this paper provide rationalization proposal for playing the role of mechanism of supervision and incentives,achieving enterprise resource optimization configuration and improving the efficiency of corporate investment.