The Impact Of Product Market Competition,Executive Incentive On The Company Overinvestment

In recent years,the investment as the main power to promote the development of economy,deeply influence the growth and development of the enterprise.At the same time,however,has played a positive role in,some improper investment behavior also brought a lot of hidden dangers.Enterprises in order to expand the scale,without strict scrutiny to invest blindly.The inefficient investment behavior once failure,the enterprise will be in financial difficulties and even bankruptcy.In order to effectively alleviate over-investment problem,thus reducing the waste of social resources,some scholars at home and abroad to choose from the perspective of product market competition or executive incentive,the research method of curb overinvestment.But as a result of these studies only looked at in isolation,executive incentive product market competition and investment relations between the two,and not the product market competition,the influence of the executive incentive for excessive investment into a system analysis framework,thus there are partial.In this paper,considering the inherent logic of relations between and among,the product market competition,and executive incentive and excessive investment,study of product market competition as an external mechanism can influence the inhibition of executive incentive to excessive investment,have certain innovation.At the same time,that excess investment will affect the long-term development of the enterprise,so this article research also has certain practical significance.This article selects the data of a-share market between 2010 and 2014 as sample,empirical study in two steps: first step,the expected investment model expected investment.By comparing the actual investment and expected investment,draw a number of companies have excessive investment behavior.The second step,the establishment of product market competition,executive incentive and excessive investment model.In this paper,the research results show that the executives monetary compensation incentive can inhibit the excessive investment behavior of the enterprise;Executive equity incentive and the product market competition,there is no significant impact on excessive investment;Product market competition is more intense,executives monetary compensation for the influence degree of the excessive investment is smaller,the our country products,market competition and executives monetary compensation incentive effect on over-investment has irreplaceable role to each other.This paper mainly includes six parts: the first section is the introduction,the overview of this part is the full text and blanket,mainly introduced the research background,research significance,the research goal of this article,research methods and content and the innovation of this article and so on;The second chapter is literature review,the part of existing research results at home and abroad are summarized and concluded.Reviewed the theory and related research results,and points out;The third chapter is the relevant theoretical basis,the relevant theory mainly includes the principal-agent theory,asymmetricinformation theory,free cash flow theory,competitive market theory and incentive theory,and introduces the product market competition,the relative concepts of executive incentive and firm excessive investment,and competition in the market for products and the correlation between executive incentive to excessive investment theory analysis;In the fourth chapter through the research hypothesis,research the selection of variables and measurement,the establishment of the research model,and sample selection and data sources to complete this article research design;Of variables in the fifth chapter is the empirical analysis,descriptive statistics,correlation,regression analysis and robustness testing;The sixth chapter and analysis the corresponding research results.For the empirical results put forward the constructive Suggestions and countermeasures,and make a research prospect.