The Impact Of Stickiness Of Executive Compensation On Corporate Overinvestment:The Moderating Role Of Non-state-owned Shareholder Governance

Investment is an important way to allocate resources.How to improve the investment efficiency of enterprises is an important problem to be solved urgently.The separation of the two rights in modern enterprise system brings adverse selection and moral hazard,and the principal-agent problem between shareholders and executives is the main cause of excessive investment.The stickiness of executive compensation directly leads to the distorted incentive mode of "heavy reward but light punishment" in enterprises.If the phenomenon of "heavy reward but light punishment" in domestic enterprises is not contained,will it further induce the self-interested behavior of managers and lead to excessive investment behavior?In order to solve this problem,this paper attempts to explore whether non-state-owned shareholders can effectively play a governance role when non-state-owned capital with private enterprises as the main body enters the original field of state-owned capital and completes the establishment of mixed ownership enterprises.Combined with the realistic environment faced by Chinese enterprises,this paper studies the relationship between the stickiness of executive compensation and excessive investment behavior from the perspective of non-state-owned shareholders’governance.In order to improve the enterprise internal governance to provide a new perspective.In this paper,A-share state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2015 to 2019 are selected as the research object to explore the relationship between executive compensation stickiness and corporate overinvestment.At the same time,the influence of non-state-owned shareholders’ governance on the relationship between executive compensation stickiness and corporate overinvestment is considered.Finally,the paper further studies the relationship between different market development levels and the hierarchy of state-owned is positively related to corporate overinvestment.The greater the stickiness of executive compensation,the greater the degree of overinvestment in the firm may be.(2)Non-state shareholder governance can inhibit the positive effect of executive compensation stickiness on corporate overinvestment.(3)Compared to SOEs listed in regions with high marketization,non-state shareholder governance has a more significant inhibitory effect on the positive relationship between executive compensation stickiness and corporate overinvestment in SOEs listed in regions with low marketization.(4)Compared with central listed companies,the inhibitory effect of non-state shareholder governance on the positive relationship between executive compensation stickiness and corporate overinvestment is more pronounced in local listed SOEs.The research in this paper has both certain theoretical and practical values,which are useful for companies to better allocate their resources and prevent inefficient investment behaviors such as over-investment,and also has certain implications for the mixed ownership reform of SOEs.