Construction And Analysis For Dynamic Bargaining Model In Relocation Disputes Under Asymmetric Information | | Posted on:2016-01-05 | Degree:Master | Type:Thesis | | Country:China | Candidate:M T Zhang | Full Text:PDF | | GTID:2349330488482181 | Subject:Project management | | Abstract/Summary: | PDF Full Text Request | | The relocation disputes have happened a lot during the development of the urbanization. And the core of the relocation dispute usually lies in the divergence on the amount of the relocation compensation and the process of fighting for it among all the players. The analysis for the relocation disputes based on the game theory and the bargaining model of Rubinstein has become a common research methods. But the effect of the asymmetric information and dynamics as well as the influence of the non-rationality features of the players on the relocation disputes have been seldom mentioned in previous research.In the view of the limitations mentioned above, this paper firstly presents the assumptions about the analysis for the relocation disputes based on the game theory. It also analyzes the process of the relocation disputes from the view of bargaining and sets the rule about how the players effect the process of relocation disputes by bargaining.Secondly, this paper constructs the dynamic bargaining model in relocation disputes under asymmetric information based on the bargaining model of Rubinstein. After introducing the impact factors of limit price and self-confidence degree in the model, this paper also presents the calculation formula of the bargaining prices of different players under the asymmetric information and dynamics.Thirdly, this paper analyzes the impact factors of the bargaining process. This paper analyzes the restriction relationship of the impact factors qualitatively and presents the calculation formulas of the limit price and the players’self-confidence respectively. The effect of the non-rationality is also presented during the calculation of the self-confidence degree of the player’s own.Finally, based on the realistic relocation dispute, this paper shows the process of the analysis using the dynamic bargaining model in relocation disputes under asymmetric information. Under different scenario assumptions, this paper shows the comparison of the calculation results, which can explains the rationality of the model. | | Keywords/Search Tags: | relocation dispute, bargaining, asymmetric information, dynamics, non-rationality | PDF Full Text Request | Related items |
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