On The Game Problem In The Real Estate Market Under Asymmetric Information

Information is very important to developer, contractor and consumer, and sincerity problems come with asymmetric information are very distinct. The asymmetric information and the complex relationship in the real estate market game make the consumers' legal right being aggrieved, the out-of-order competition between real estate firms makes the market fall in chaos, the asymmetric information between real estate firm and bank increases the bank's finance risk, the asymmetric information between developer and contractor prevents the promised quality from realizing. From the aspect of information economics, asymmetric information is the primary reason to the dissension between consumer and corporation and between corporations.By taking asymmetric information and sincerity as a clue, this paper analyzes the complex relationship among the participants by using game theory, information economics and evolution game theory.First, the author analyzes the status in quo and existing problems in China's real estate market, gives the literature review, points out the research situation and direction, and arranges the structure.Second, the author analyzes the game between real estate developer, bank investor and land supplier - government. And then points out that in order to avoid problems cause by asymmetric information, it is needed to reduce information difference between the two trade parties, resolve the repetitive mortgage problem, remove the rent seeking in land auction, decrease the real estate market bubble from macro and micro ways.Third, this paper analyzes the relationship among the same trade in real estate market in the way of quality and price. And points out that firms would gain profit in the cost of quality due to the asymmetric information in short term. But in long term, this non- sincerity moral hazard may turn to market adverse selection, and is unsuitable for the market's healthy development.Fourth, the author analyzes the bargaining problem between developer and contractor, rent seeking and rent costing problem between developer and government officer, agency problem between engineering supervisor and contractor, and then bring...