Research Of Loan Pricing Of New Rural Financial Institution

In recent years, with the continuous development of agriculture, rural areas and farmers, the demand for multi-level and diversified financial products and services in the rural areas is becoming more and more urgent. For a long time, the loan business is the main source of profits of bank institutions. As the core factor of the allocation of credit resource, loan price has s large influence on the profitability of financial institutions. In the context of the promotion of interest rate marketization and the constraint of the farmers’poor ability of bearing debt, the weak quality of agriculture, the reasonableness of loan price of new rural financial institutions is closely related to its own development. However, the loan pricing ability of the new rural financial institutions in China is weak, and the existing research has not yet been involved into this field. Therefore, this paper studies the loan pricing of new rural financial institutions, which has important research value and research significance.This paper takes the loan pricing of new rural financial institutions as research object, takes loan pricing theory as the theoretical basis, takes Gansu Yunfa Group Small Loan Company as the object, through deep case analysis, analyzes existing problems in the loan pricing of new rural financial institutions such as lack the awareness of loan pricing, the faultiness of loan pricing mechanism is, high and single loan interest rates, and the low ability of risk assessment. The article then analyses the causes of these problems such as high cost of loans, acute information asymmetry, the lack of supporting technology, data, human resources, and the unreasonableness in choosing loan pricing model. Considering the problems mentioned above, through the establishment of signaling game model, the article analyzed the problems such as information asymmetry and adverse selection which new rural financial institutions might come across during the process of loan pricing in the context of interest rate marketization. Through probability of authentication information and three kinds of Bayesian equilibrium, the article studied the real content and the hidden intention in the process of information transmission, analyzed variable factors which might have influence on the loan pricing of new rural financial institutions, established reasonable loan pricing discrimination mechanism. Finally, through the establishment of a three-stage Hotelling game model, the article put forward policy recommendations to improve the loan pricing mechanism of new rural financial institutions, including establishment of better information sharing mechanism, credit information database and credit rating standards to improve the credit system, set up more perfect market economy system on the level of country, improving the effectiveness of the existing loan pricing mechanism through grasping the information of customer accurately and increasing the intensity of the punishment of the transmission of false information on the level of new rural financial institutions. In addition, the study also suggests that new rural financial institutions should strengthen the consciousness of loan pricing, choose the strategy based on the RAROC loan pricing model and choose pricing strategies which are different from competitors so as to promote the development of new rural financial institutions and then make further contribution to agriculture, rural areas and farmers.