Study On Rent Extraction In The Design Of Private Enterprise Stock Option Incentive

Stock option incentive mechanism can not only solve the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers,but also can keep senior managers for the company,but in recent years,the stock option incentive contract appeared some problems has caused larger issues,such as the exercise standard is low,single assessment index and short validity.Whether the stock option incentive mechanism can solve the problem of agency?Incentives had became into benefits?In order to study this problem,this article from the perspective of Stock option incentive contract elements studied the self-interested behavior of executives.Firstly,this paper reviews the relevant literature on rent extraction in the design of equity incentive and the influence of management authority on the design of equity incentive contract,and summarizes the current situation and problems of the research.Secondly,on the basis of the principal-agent theory,the theory of management power and the analysis of contract elements,this paper put forward the relevant assumptions.Based on the implementation of stock option incentive plan for the first time in 2009-2014 of 391 private listed companies as samples,this paper explores the high management's behavior and characteristics in the stock option incentive plan from the point of view of the management power.The study found that:Firstly,private enterprises in our country exsits significant rent extraction in the design of stock option incentive plan,its characteristic performance are as follows:Most companies choose roa and roe as evaluation indexes,single performance indicators and obvious imitation,the two measures are based on financial indicators,easy manipulation by management,few companies use value indicators and cash flow indicators,very few enterprises adopt horizontal index,formulation of a lower standard of exercise,26% of the company set the standard of exercise less than the company's performance that three years ago,the validity of stock option incentive is shorter,only 6% of more than 5 years.Secondly,managers can use their power to influence the stock option incentive plan,the greater the management power,the more obvious self-interest behavior.The rate of assets and liabilities of enterprises has restriction on the management of self-interest behavior,showed that the creditors can effectively supervise the behavior of the management.The company's growth and performance is better,the more benefit nature of equity incentive plan.Finally,based on the conclusion of the empirical study,this paper puts forward some proposals from the angle of the external environment and internal management.