Research On Selective Information Disclosure Behavior During The Period Of Before And After Announcement Date Of Equity Incentive

Equity incentive system is widely used in Europe and most other countries.However,it is relatively slow start-up and development in our country in 2006,"Equity Incentive Measures for the Administration of Listed Companies" document means the beginning of China's listed companies formally introduced equity incentive system,equity incentive reform measures mentioned in the market,as the parties as the key to enhance the value of the company's development.Since the implementation of the exercise of stock options,restricted stock incentives for companies to determine the price related to the costs required to pay the executives the right line and the capital gains obtained by the sale of executives as rational "economic man," we have reason to they believe in the equity incentive plan draft before the announcement when there is opportunistic behavior Optional information disclosure,disclosure of information by manipulating to get a lower exercise price,resulting in higher capital gains.As the number of the company's equity incentive rising contemplated herein domestic listed companies will also be a variety of management's opportunistic behavior,have an incentive to use their own strengths to information bulletin on the draft equity incentive plan the timing and date of the order of information disclosure select.The article selects 274 listed companies which for the first time disclosed a stock option plan and 266 listed companies which for the first time disclosed a restricted stock plan in China from January 2006 to December 2015,and tending to examine by empirical research whether the management will use their information advantage or not,especially the information advantage in earnings information to select the timing.Firstly,using the normative research method to analyze the changes of of stock price,calculate cumulative abnormal return,apply descriptive statistics and t t est.After that,two models are published by using company characteristics and manag ement authority as variables,linear regression is adapted to study whether executives can make selective disclosure for their own profit.Finally,good and bad news for co mpanies are re-definition and re-classification to further clarify the relationship between the selective of information and the strength of equity incentive.After empirical analysis,we have the following conclusions: Executive management has the more power,the more motivated to take their opportunism selective disclosure of market timing behavior of the draft before the announcement,the share price before the effects of changes to the draft after the announcement,to achieve their own interests to maximize;And the announcement of the stock options the company's executives use more power to control selective information disclosure than the intensity of the announcement of the company's executives restricted shares control efforts...