Study On The Decision Making Behavior Of Interest Subjects In Financial Control

With the separation of ownership and management right if the enterprise, the problem of control right allocation arises at the historic moment. In the enterprise, the decision under the background of control between different interest subjects, the behavior of stakeholders and has important influence on the distribution of control. Based on the company financial control to corporate governance provides a good environment for this article research.Therefore under control perspective to study the enterprise decision making behavior of the main stakeholders can make people to control them have more clear and comprehensive understanding, but also for the companies provide guidance and support for corporate governance activities.The study found that managers collusion between large shareholders and mainly by regional laws and regulations, supervision of enterprise other stakeholders and conspiracy costs; Big shareholders and creditors and shareholders and minority shareholders decision-making behavior is restricted by factors such as degree of regional laws and regulations standard. Large shareholders and managers of decision-making behavior in the process of game constantly strategy optimization, evolutionary direction is from conspired to conspiracy; Decision-making behavior of big shareholders and creditors in the regulation game from (heavily regulated, benefit expropriation) to (lightly regulated, the benefit expropriation) evolution, namely perfecting the law degree is low, big shareholders of decision-making behavior tend to maximize their own interests by way of benefit expropriation, anti conversely. At the same time, due to the imperfect legal protection of creditors and encouraged them to take tightly regulated strategy, to maintain their own rights and interests are not violated. But as the legal system and regulations gradually standard, makes the big shareholders occupy behavior has brought its greater than the loss of income, as a result, major shareholders are more inclined to choose the benefit expropriation behavior benefit and creditors can also choose to lightly regulated strategy, based on law and justice program maintenance access should have interests; The evolution of other stakeholders also broadly.In conclusion, this article through the theoretical research and empirical research, the combination of demonstration enterprise decision-making behavior of each related interest subjects. The results show that the various stakeholders the rationality of decision-making behavior and negative relationship between legal perfection. Therefore, under the background of the rational allocation of financial control, through the perfect legal laws and regulations, help standardizing enterprise decision-making behavior of different interest subjects.