The Actual Controller,Innovation Input And Business Performance

Since the corporate governance is raised,academics,research on corporate governance has been uninterrupted.Especially for the study of ownership structure continuously.In the study of corporate governance,most of the researches nearly half a century follow the Berle-Mean research paradigm of “strengthen management,weaken ownership” under the diffuse ownership of agency problems about the company's shareholders and managers for nearly half a century.After 1990 s,LLSV model has gradually become the foundation of the research on corporate governance,through the study of different equity structures in different countries,found that the companies were concentrated in most of the countries.In the companies which have relatively concentrated ownership,the controller mainly through the pyramid shareholding or cross-shareholdings to control the largest shareholder,leading to the separation of residual claim and residual control,the controller who has less ownership has more rights of control,resulting in the separation of ownership and control of the controller.In this case,in order to be able to understand the modern company ownership structure,we need to trace the actual controller who controls the company and study the governance performance,to explore the optimal configuration of ownership and control of the actual controller.Enterprises as the mainstay of innovation,the input of innovation resources ultimately depends on the final decision makers.Studying the influence of the actual controller on innovation input has vital significance for enterprise development.This article selects panel data of A-share listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen listing Corporation in 2007-2014 as research samples.Using the combination of the theoretical analysis and empirical research,the influence of actual controllers on innovation input,the influence of the actual controllers on business performance and the influence of the input of innovation on the business performance under the influence of the actual controllers are further studied.The following conclusions are drawn as:Firstly,an increase in the proportion of control right of the actual controller inhibits the innovation input,an increase in the proportion of ownship of the actual controller has an inhibitory effect on the innovation input of the enterprise,and two rights separation degree has no significant impact on innovation input,the actual controller of state-owned property company for innovation is not strong,which is not conducive to enterprise innovation investment.Secondly,from the influence of the actual controllers on business performance,the conclusions are the higher the control proportion of the actual controllers are,the business performance of the enterprise improve;the higher the proportion of ownership of the actual controllers promote the improvement of business performance;The increase of two rights separation degree have a positive role in promoting for business performance.But the business performance of the actual controllers of state-owned properties is lower than non-state-owned companies.Thirdly,before we research on the influence of the actual controller on innovation input and business performance,firstly,we need to analyze the relations between innovation input and business performance,through empirical test,this paper argues that innovation input has no significant impact on business performance.Within a medium range the proportion of actual controllers,control will hinder the positive correlation between innovation input and business performance;the ownership of the actual controllers,ratio within a medium range also will hinder the positive correlation between innovation input and business performance;two rights separation degree influences the relationship between them insignificantly;the actual controllers of state-owned property can weaken the negative relationship between innovation input and business performance.Through the conclusions above the following suggestions are put forward: firstly,to strengthen information disclosure of the actual controllers of listed companies,the supervision.Secondly,the companies should be appropriate to reduce ownership concentration,reduce the executives seek personal gain.Third,the government as a guide should provide the corresponding policies to support the enterprises' innovation and development.Fourthly,for state-owned enterprises,they need to continue to deepen the reform.