Corporate Merger And Acquisition,The Motivation Of The Reconstruction Of Control Right Structure And The Characteristics Of Pyramid Structure

In recent years, some studies have found that the ownership structure of pyramid exists in the enterprise groups. Why does the actual controller tend to adopt the pyramid stock structure to control the company? The results of previous studies mainly focus on the economic consequences caused by the ownership structure in pyramid, but the research on the formation of the ownership structure in pyramid is very limited. In this paper, from the perspective of the reconstruction of ownership structure, this paper analyzes the reasons for the formation of the ownership structure in pyramid, and analyzes the influence of pyramid structure characteristics on the performance of M & A.In this paper, we take M & A events from 2010 to 2014 as the research samples. Then using the methods of empirical research, we will test the connection between the decisive factors of M & A and the control structure reconstruction motivation and research the influence of all above problems on the structure characteristics of pyramid. Finally, we will study the question of why Chinese listing corporation mainly choice pyramid as the equity structure after the M & A. The main research works are as follows:(1) Group the samples according to the characteristics of the company M & A behavior variables, and then test whether there were significant differences in the control structure reconstruction motivation and in the pyramid structure characteristics by univariate analysis;(2) Construct the empirical model between the control structure reconstruction motivation and the company merger and acquisition behavior variables to search the connection between them;(3) Construct the empirical model between the pyramid structure characteristics and the control structure reconstruction motivation to search the connection between them;(4) Make the M & A performance as dependent variable and the company M & A behavior variables, the pyramid structure characteristics and the motivation of the reconstruction of control right structure as independent variables to study the economic consequences under M & A and the structure of pyramid.The results of this study show that:(1) when the control structure reconstruction is private benefits motives, listing corporation are often placed in the bottom of the pyramid equity structure, and the degree of separation of control rights and cash flow rights is larger; but when the control structure reconstruction is the direct control of high quality company, the result is the opposite.(2) The number of control level and corporate short-term performance has a significant negative correlation, the degree of separation between control rights and cash flow rights is positively correlated with the short-term performance. From the long-term performance of M & A, there is no significant correlation between the number of control levels, the separation of the two rights and the long-term performance of the corporate.(3) The private benefits motivation has a significant positive correlation to corporate short-term performance, the direct control of high quality company motivation and corporate short-term performance is not significantly related. From the long-term performance of mergers and acquisitions, there is no significant correlation between the private benefits motivation, the direct control of high quality company motivation and the long-term performance of the corporate. This shows that in the pyramid ownership structure, corporation merger and acquisition behavior is mainly to short-term cash, rather than to seek the long-term performance growth of the company, confirms the tunneling behavior of ultimate controlling shareholders.Finally, according to the results of this study, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions.