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A Study On The Relationship Between Pyramid Ownership Structure,Institutional Investors And Enterprise Performance

Posted on:2020-12-11Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H J MiaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330590980964Subject:Financial
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In the 1930 s,Berle and Means pointed out the relationship between the ownership structure and performance of the company for the first time,and believed that the ownership of the enterprise was decentralized.The principal-agent contradiction between the manager and the owner caused by the right of control and management is difficult to optimize the company's performance.Later,scholars headed by La porta put forward the concept of ultimate controlling shareholder for the first time,and found that most countries have the phenomenon of equity concentration.Therefore,in addition to the contradiction between the company's operators and managers,the company's principal-agent contradiction also has the contradiction between the ultimate controlling shareholder and the small and medium-sized shareholders.The ultimate controller within the company makes its own control greater than the cash flow right through the pyramid ownership structure.That is to say,the smaller cash flow right can be used to achieve a relatively greater control over the company.As an important participant in an enterprise,institutional investors play a very important role in the improvement of corporate performance,and are closely related to the pyramid ownership structure of enterprises.Based on the theory bellow,the paper selects the Shanghai A-share listed company that discloses the pyramid shareholding structure chart and the characteristics of institutional investors in the company's annual report from 2010 to 2017 as the research object,and uses the stata software to screen according to certain principles,and finally obtains 626 Shanghai A-share listed companies and analyse the 5008 valid sample data.According to 5008 panel data of 626 A-share listed companies in Shanghai stock market from 2010 to 2017,using the characteristics of current situation analysis and empirical analysis to study the relationship between pyramid ownership structure and corporate performance,and the characteristics of corporate institutional investors' impact on the relationship between the two.In the qualitative analysis of this paper,the present situation of pyramid equity structure and institutional investors of 626 A-share listed enterprises in Shanghai stock market are studied and analyzed sequentially.Secondly,based on the three variables of cash flow right,control right and two rights separation in pyramid structure,the relationship between the three variables and enterprise performance is studied and analyzed.Finally,the relationship between institutional investor ownership and corporate performance is studied and analyzed.In the aspect of empirical research,the regression analysis of the selected 5008 panel data is carried out by using stata,and the pyramidal ownership structure is used to analyze the relationship between pyramid ownership structure and enterprises.On this basis,we further investigate the moderating effect of institutional investors' holding on this effect.Both methods show that for enterprises with pyramid ownership structure,there is a positive correlation between the cash flow rights owned by the ultimate controller and the firm performance,and that there is a positive correlation between the cash flow rights owned by the ultimate controllers and the firm performance.There is a negative correlation between the control right of the ultimate controller and the performance of the firm,and there is a negative correlation between the separation of the two rights of the cash flow right and the control right of the ultimate controller and the performance of the firm.In addition,the absolute ownership of the corporate institutional investors and the relative ownership of the institutional investors can effectively restrain the ultimate controller's behavior of encroaching on the interests of the enterprise caused by the separation of the control rights and the cash flow rights.
Keywords/Search Tags:Pyramid shareholding structure, Institutional investor, Business Performance, control, Cash flow rights, Separation of powers
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