The Influence Of Executive Stock Incentive Intensity On Accounting Conservatism

Accounting conservatism is an important standard to measure the quality of financial reporting information, which is very important to the users of accounting information. Listing Corporation executives are not only the operators of the enterprise, but also the people who submitted the enterprise accounting information, and have a close relationship with the level of accounting conservatism. Executive equity incentive system is generally accepted that can effectively avoid the short-sighted behavior of executives. So, Can the executive equity incentive really effectively avoid the executives to control accounting information as well as improving the level of accounting conservatism? Does the level of accounting conservatism of the enterprise related to the size of the executive stock ownership incentive? Is there a difference in this relationship between state-owned listing Corporation and non- state- owned listing Corporation?In this paper, the annual observations of the 11864 companies from 2010 to 2015 are used as the effective research samples to test the accounting conservatism level of listing Corporation in our country. And the 7409 observed values are used to examine the influence of the executive stock incentive intensity on the accounting conservatism. Results show that: The quality of accounting information in the listing Corporation is steady; The intensity of executive equity incentive and corporate accounting conservatism is negatively correlated; The negative correlation between equity incentive intensity and firm accounting conservatism is significant in the non-state- owned listing Corporation, but not in the State- owned listing Corporation.This paper mainly has three aspects of contribution: First, this paper uses two indicators of the proportion of executive ownership and high equity ratio to measure the intensity of executive equity incentive. Through two different perspectives in the measurement of the size of the executive stock incentive intensity, this research makes up for the lack of a single index measure, which makes the research conclusion more convincing; Second, this paper combines the special market environment of our country. The samples of state-owned listing Corporation and non- state- owned listing Corporation were studied respectively, which offers strong practical significance to the results; Third, this paper put forward policy suggestions on how to improve the accounting conservatism of the company in the case of the implementation of executive equity incentive for listing Corporation.