Study On The Quality Control In Supply Chain Of Complex Product Considering On-time Delivery Level

With the development of science and technology, the competition between enterprises has been transformed into supply chains. Supply chain management plays an important role in manufacturing enterprises and is also the focus of the academic research. Complex product supply chain is a special kind of supply chain, and comparing with general products, complex product has special characteristics such as high quality, strict delivery time, a little batch and so on. Once the product has quality problem, it will cause a lot of loss. Complex supply chain has the uniqueness of complex product, and it also inherits the universality of the supply chain. Therefore, the complex supply chain quality management research is very necessary.Quality levels and delivery on-time delivery level are two important factors in evaluation of complex product suppliers. Because of the main manufacturers in the complex product supply chain, this paper also focuses on main manufacturers in supply chain, considering five variables: quality level and delivery level of supplier, quality level and inspection level of manufacturer, encouraging supplier to supply high quality level and delivery on time product based on two contracts: one is external lose sharing contract, the other one is internal punishment contract.Firstly, a quality control model for supply chain is analyzed. Secondly, using the Lagrange multiplier method under the Principal-agent theory, the optimal solution of two contracts are drawn based on single moral hazard and double moral hazard, and getting the relationship of price, punishment, other contract elements. Lastly, in both moral hazards, comparing the fairness of two contracts after the simulation verification, the result shows that the external loss sharing contracts will be effective with the increase of the supplier's quality costs, delivery costs or reputation costs. When manufacturer's quality-control cost is low, the external loss sharing contracts will be effective. The external loss sharing contracts will be unfair with the increase of the manufacturer's quality costs. In double moral hazard, Incentive parameter in internal punishment contract is approximately equal to zero and only plays a regulatory role.This paper analyzes the fairness of two contracts based on effectiveness. So, to realize the quality coordination in complex product supply chain, fairness of the contract is underlying premise and should be first.