Research On Optimization Of Supplier Contract Based On Complex Product

Globalization and integration is today’s economic development trend and with the momentum of rapid rise. Competition among enterprises is gradually transformed into the competition on the supply chain. Supply chain management is valued by enterprise and become the focus of academic research. Complex products have the characteristics of high-cost and high-quality, and the bidirectional loss cost caused by substandard product is also great. Therefore, the quality management of complex products research has important significance.Monitoring suppliers to provide high quality products and on-time delivery are two important aspects of the supply chain quality management of complex products. The article focus on considering manufacturers led to motivate the supplier on-time delivery of high-quality products through the external quality loss or internal mass loss and postpone implementation of punishment and reward suppliers. Firstly, the article establishes the cost function and continuous revenue function of complex products’ suppliers and manufacturers. It considers the supplier under the supervision of manufacturers and its co-production in the supply chain and gains the optimal solution conditions of maximizing joint with the use of the maximum principle. After using of the Lagrange multiplier method, it draws the optimal solution with dominant manufacturers based on external failure information and internal inspection information, and gets relationship of price, reward, punishment or other contract elements. At the same time, it uses the Stackelberg game to research quality contracts and gets the results under the both cases of the external failure information and incoming inspection information.In this study, the article gains consistency of manufacturers led optimal solution and joint income optimal solution, this also shows that the manufacturer dominant and joint production are with the same level of quality and costs, The monopoly advantage position of manufacturers in the joint production also exists. After, it researches by Stackelberg game under these situation. Then it gets changes of punish, reward, price through numerical case studies. In the end, it makes the final conclusions of the article and inadequacies.