Font Size: a A A

Research On The Relationship Between Ownership Structure,Incentive Mechanism And Corporate Performance Of Listed Companies In China

Posted on:2017-03-16Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z K JiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2349330512461285Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,the study on the model of management incentive receives extensive attention of the finance and accounting field,has become the top priority of the enterprise management research.However,some studies think that work hard for incentive management in enterprises,encouraging management to maintain consistency with corporate interests,the interests of incentive model does not take in the course of development according to the expected effect.Even in some degree,the incentive measures increase the transaction costs or management costs,and don't protect the interests of stakeholders.Therefore,the author combined with the company's financial goals and investors interests protection's research,and on the basis of the internal environment analyzing the relationship between the incentive model and corporate performance,then analyzing the relationship between different incentive mode for enterprises in the development of deep insight into different environment play a productive level.In relatively decentralized equity in the corporate governance structure,few investors have absolute control to decide the enterprise's decision-making and daily management.In this case,the big shareholders do not have enough power to supervision management,and lacking of strict constraints and supervision management will be more lazy.They give the reasons such as the recession and flagging industry development prospects to the performance level decrease too much.Management is no consistent with the interests of the stakeholders,which will damage the interests of investors,and then making the enterprise performance level at lower levels;In equity relative concentration of the corporate governance structure,some shareholders control the decision,and the big shareholders is closely with the interests of company,so in order to avoiding the administrator to slack off in work,they often strengthen the supervision and inspection of administrative personnel.In addition,managers may encroach on the interests of minority shareholders with management.Therefore,researching in different corporate governance environment,the influence of different incentive mechanism on enterprise performance,depending on the management in different environment,management comprehensive trade-offs between its own interests and the interests of the company results.At the same time,the author also discusses the enterprise properties(mainly state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises)of their own environment,enterprise heterogeneity on the consistency of the above research conclusion.We selected 223211 observations from 2188 A-share listed companies which took equity incentive salary incentive as samples,and with different ownership structure,enterprise take incentive mode to study enterprise performance.The study suggest that ownership concentration and corporate performance present a u-shaped distribution.When stake ownership is relatively loose,in the case of other conditions being unchanged,with the increase of equity concentration,enterprise performance shows a downward trend;When Equity concentration exceeds a certain level,other things being equal,as the further increase of ownership concentration,corporate performance show a rising trend.Further,according to the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance,we divide the enterprise into equity-concentrated and equity-separation,aiming to study how incentive mechanism affects enterprise performance.Study shows that in the ownership structure of high concentration group,the effects on enterprise performance is significant,meaning that equity concentration to some degree constrains the management decision,making the management can't make decision according to their own professional judgment to the enterprise management,remaining substantial executive power.Studying how incentive compensation impact corporate performance under different ownership structure not only enriches the theory of the incentive mechanism of corporate governance,but also expand the effectiveness of incentive mechanism under enterprise environment,and the conclusion is helpful to guide the enterprise management in the process of choosing incentive mechanism providing a feasible reference.In addition,equity checks and balances improves the internal governance environment as well as promoting management incentive mechanism play a better role.Therefore,when enterprise develops internal governance structure,they should fully consider how ownership concentration and incentive compensation affect enterprise performance.
Keywords/Search Tags:Equity structure, Incentive mechanism, Corporate performance, Corporate governance
PDF Full Text Request
Related items