The Analysis Of Participants’ Behavior Of Farmland Management Rights Transfer

Our country GDP rose by 6.9% year on year in 2015, and the economic growth fell below 0.7% for th e first time in 25 years.There was increasing pressure of the economic downturn in China. In addition, Chin a’s agricultural development constraints became more complex, which was retained by environment.The"c eiling" and "floor" effects of agricultural products has gradually appeared.China’s agricultural development was bound by "yellow line" and "red light" seriously.Under such grim background, we must rely on "far mland management rights transfer",achieving agricultural land scale management, innovating agricultural business entities and management,to realize agricultural modernization development,mechanization of oper ations and market-oriented production,to reduce the cost of agricultural production, and to increase the inte rnational competitiveness of Chinese agricultural products in the end.Therefore, the study of transfer of the contractual rights of land is very important.(1)By longitudinal analysis method,the paper analyzes the action of each participating body in each process of farmland management rights transfer:Based on micro perspective, the paper constructs strategy game model to analyze the transferor’s and transferee’s action in farmland management rights transfer.The results include:Realization of management rights transfer need to lift the worries of landless peasants;By increasing transferee’s income, reducing circulation costs, increasing the revenue of transferor or the sense of satisfy after occurring farmland management rights transfer,increases their enthusiasm of participating in the transfer.(2)Based on micro perspective, the paper constructs expand game modell to analyze the action of transferee and financial institution in loans.The result is that higher management right of agricultural mortgage rates can increase profitability of financial institutions, but also can reduce the probability of non-payment of the transferee.(3)Based on micro perspective, the paper constructs strategy game model to analyze the government regulation and the transferee’s farming practices.The results include:If there is no binding agreement outbound, transferee may choose to change the use of agricultural land when them taking into account the maximization of their own interests;By increasing the penalties for transferee, reducing government regulation risks and other ways,reduces the probability of transferee changing the use of agricultural land.(4)Based on a macro perspective, the paper builds cooperative game model to analyze thealliance{1,2,3,4}.The result is that transfering the utility of farmland management rights transfer to each participant who Participates farmland management rights transfer,and then makes farmland management rights transfer process rendered spiral structure.Under microscopic perspective, the considerations of the individuals (participants of farmland management rights transfer) are to maximize their own interests. So, there will be hindered factor in agricultural land management rights transfer. Under macro perspective,the considerations of the group (the alliance) is to maximize their group’s interests,that is to maximize national interests, agricultural interests.So,transfering the utility of farmland management rights transfer to each participant who Participates farmland management rights to increase their enthusiasm of participating in the transfer.