Voluntary Disclosure,excess Executive Compensation,and Firm Performance

In recent years,the listed company executive compensation price phenomenon has caused widespread concern of the public,the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts that the theory of optimal compensation contract is being questioned by more and more,whether the compensation contract can also ease the agency conflict between executives and shareholders,whether the compensation contract still has existing applicability? The power management theory that executive compensation contract did not inhibit original salary system design of the principal-agent problem,and has become the management rent-seeking tool,resulting in executives sacrifice their business interests for their own interests.High price executive pay supports the management theory hypothesis to a certain extent.The management of executive compensation caused by the absence of supervision of management authority,and also has changed the compensation contract hypothesis,which resulted in the decoupling of executive pay and corporate performance.The voluntary disclosure of information is considered to be relatively independent of the external supervision mechanism,can effectively enhance corporate information transparency,including executive compensation information transparency,so as to improve the social "anger costs" of executives using their own power to manipulate pay.Full disclosure of voluntary information to a certain extent,increased the difficulty of executive manipulate compensation,is conducive to significantly ease the decoupling of executive pay and corporate performance.Based on this,this paper from 2012 to 2014 listed companies as samples,through the study of managerial power theory,information asymmetry theory to analyze the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance of listed companies,and examines the voluntary disclosure of listed companies pay performance sensitivity.The results showed that:(1)executive pay and corporate performance of listed companies still have a significant positive correlation,shows that the listed companies pay the contract still has very strong applicability to a certain extent,the theory of optimal compensation contract still has a certain role in reducing conflicts between shareholders and executives.However,excess compensation and performance has significant negative correlation,indicating that excess compensation is distorted products on executive compensation contracts,executives through their own power to the enterprise rent grab,and does not reflect the efforts of senior level itself and performance of enterprises.(2)the conflict between the executives and shareholders mainly for executives lack of effective supervision,the voluntary disclosure of information as a supplement to the supervision mechanism of compensation,found that voluntary disclosure has significant moderating effect on the pay performance sensitivity of listed companies,voluntary disclosure overall decoupling can effectively alleviate the excess compensation and corporate executives performance,improve enterprise performance sensitivity.According to the research results,this paper argues that the enterprise needs to improve the executive compensation and corporate performance management system,the introduction of a variety of indicators,effectively prevent executives obtain excess compensation;at the same time,enhance the level of voluntary disclosure of information,because the information asymmetry brings to alleviate the adverse selection and moral risk;to strengthen the media,market intermediary organizations and the public external supervision,improve the transparency of executive pay.In summary,this study enriches the research on the correlation between executive compensation in excess of executives,verify the excess compensation distortions on the effectiveness of corporate compensation contract,from the perspective of voluntary information disclosure test its impact on listed companies pay performance sensitivity,provides a new way for listed companies to alleviate agency problems of compensation.