Quality Of Information Disclosure,Management Power And Executive Compensation Performance Sensitivity

Whether the executive compensation contract can effectively play an incentive role has been an important part of the research in the field of corporate governance,in recent years,the phenomenon of sky-high compensation,zero compensation and mismatch between compensation and performance of top executive occurs frequently in listed companies,which has aroused widespread concern of the public.Many scholars start from principal-agent theory and optimal contract theory to study the effectiveness of compensation contracts,however,there are concerns that information asymmetry between owners and managers of listed companies will also affect the effectiveness of the signing of compensation contracts.The improvement of information disclosure quality of listed companies can alleviate the problem of information asymmetry,so that senior executives can more reasonably evaluate the efforts of the management,thereby affecting the effectiveness of compensation contracts.At the same time,as an important part of the compensation contract,the management plays a decisive role in the listed companies,with the reform of decentralizing power of state-owned enterprises and the rapid development of private enterprises,management power has become a significant issue that can not be ignored in corporate governance.According to the above background,and combined with the general existence of some incentive mechanism failure problem in the current listed companies,this paper mainly studies the influence of information disclosure quality and management power on executive compensation performance sensitivity,and explores the impact of management power on the relationship between information disclosure quality and executive compensation performance sensitivity,which aims to provide certain theoretical reference and experience support for listed companies to improve the compensation contract system and improve the sensitivity of executive compensation performance.Based on the analysis of principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,optimal contract theory and management power theory,this paper adopts the method of combing normative research with empirical research,taking the non-equilibrium paneldata from 2014-2018 of A-share listed companies of Shenzhen stock exchange as research samples,and constructs multiple linear regression models,then the following conclusions are drawn:(1)information disclosure quality is positively correlated with executive compensation performance sensitivity;(2)management power will reduce executive compensation performance sensitivity;(3)management power will suppress the positive effect of the improvement of information disclosure quality on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance.Finally,through the analysis of the above conclusions,from the macro and micro levels specific suggestions are proposed to improve the effectiveness of compensation contracts of listed companies in our country: At the macro level,China securities regulatory commission and other regulatory departments should strengthen the supervision of information disclosure of listed companies,speed up the establishment and improvement of relevant laws and regulations,and strengthen the punishment of illegal behaviors of management and effectively restrain their abuse of power to conduct salary manipulation accelerating the formation of an effective manger market.At the micro level,on the one hand,listed companies should strengthen the system constructions and supervision of internal information disclosure,and intensify the review of all links to improve the information disclosure quality;on the other hand,they should strengthen the supervision and constraint on the management power and improve the compensation incentive mechanism of listed companies.