The Time Consistency Of The Pollution Control Game Model And Its Cooperative Solution

In recent years,environmental issues have increasingly attracted national attention.Although there are many agreements related to environmental protection,global environmental governance is still unsatisfactory.One of the important reasons is that the implementation of global environmental governance agreement is a long process.During the long course,the cooperation between countries is difficult to maintain consistent throughout.Another important reason is the differences between the interests of countries.During the global environmental governance process,different countries have different national conditions and interests.So that it's difficult to achieve long-run stable cooperation.Considering the above two reasons,we establishes and studies the cooperative pollution control game model and the cooperative pollution control game model with non-transferable utility.For the cooperative pollution control game model,we apply Shapley value to allocate the total payoff of all countries.We establish a time-consistent imputation distribution procedure so that the initial agreement remains valid for the duration of the whole game.At the same time,we calculate the parameters when the National players to meet the irrational behavioral proof and the asynchronous irrational behavior proof conditions.For the cooperative pollution control game model with non-transferable payment,we propose the concept of time consistent irrational behavior proof condition for the stability of cooperation.And we study the time consistency of irrational behavior proof condition in this model by specific numerical analysis.In addition,based on the payment distribution procedure,we establish the time consistent irrational behavioral proof conditions in game process,so as to ensure that the national player will not abandon the cooperation without any irrational behavior at any time.