Research On PPP Franchise Project Governance Based On Relational Contract

The financing mode of PPP franchise project is suitable for infrastructure, public utilities and natural resources development and other large and medium-sized projects. It can effectively alleviate the financial burden, and introduce new management mode of new technologies to improve the operation efficiency of the project. But lots of PPP projects have many problems in operation period because of the PPP project has the characteristics of large investment, long time construction, multi participants and wide influence. In study, the failure cooperation between project participants lies in the contradictions and problems were not soluted. Therefore, how to establish a scientific mechanism to solve that the formal contract can not solve the problem has become a hot spot and difficult problem in PPP project contract governance.The major studies of this thesis:(1)After reading a lot of The domestic and foreign literature about PPP project, project governance and relational contract, the connotation of PPP franchise project governance and relational contract is analyzed deeply in this thesis. (2)Combined with the connotation of PPP franchise project, franchise contract between government and private investors, work contract between investor and builders have been analyzed from three dimensions including whole-process, whole-role, whole-comprehensive governance. The main governance problems in PPP whole-process(Pre decision phase, bidding phase, construction phase, bidding phase, construction phase, operation phase) has been thoroughly reviewed. (3)According to the influence in project governance by future cooperation, trust, flexibility, information exchange and reputation mechanism of relational contract,from the combination of formal contract governance and relational contract governance's point of view,the three-dimensional governance structure is designed based on the contract relationship between the subjects, the self-enforcement system is established in PPP project, the governance idea that solve the problems of interest conflict, risk sharing, control rights sharing between government and private investors, also builder's opportunism behavior has been found. (4)Two mathematical models have been established in connection with two difficult problems in governance structure:One has been established in connection with distribution of interests called Nash negotiation model.In this model,the fuzzy analysis method was used to determine the risk sharing coefficient,then the interests distribution coefficient has been drawn. Another one has been established in connection with builder's opportunism behavior problem, the point that relational contract has played a big part of PPP project governance has been argued by structuring the multi stage game model of relational contract based on negative incentive mechanism. The results has showed the points that there has been a way which negative incentive mechanism was included to make the builder from maximizing overall efficiency of PPP project's point of view to choose the optimal investment level, then solving the builder's opportunism behavior problem. (5)taking Beijing metro line four for a example to analyze its operation mode and franchise agreements, the corporate governance problems have been found out and analyzed, the problem of interests distribution between government and private investors has been solved by interests distribution mechanism, the practical effects of relational contract have been pointed out in this project.This thesis is based on relational contract theory to discuss the positive influence of relational contract on effectivity of PPP project governance, a new way to research the PPP project governance has been given. And then, combined with formal contract governance and relational contract governance to achieve the comprehensive goal that maximizing the overall efficiency of project, resolving the interests contradiction between all parties, preventing the opportunism behavior, establishing the self-enforcing mechanism in project.