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Service Subsidies And Supply Chain Game Research With Co-retailers

Posted on:2015-05-29Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y Y LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330488999062Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the change of market dynamic and competitive environment,non-price factors such as service gradully become the important factor that affect consumers' purchase decision.The competitive becomes the price and service competition from the price competition between the enterprises.The retailer will improve the service quality of the goods(such as physical experience,customization,etc)to improve the added value of the product and the consumers' welfare in order to maximize its interests.However,the manufactures provide certain service subsidies to the retailer in order to make their products stand out in the alternative products.Only in this way,can they get greater service support and increase the advantages of their products in service.Service comprtition between products becomes a indispensable factor and academic research hot spot in recent years.Its main characteristic is the problem of the supply chain coordination based on price and service competition.Based on the summary of scholars'research on the supply chain coordination problem at home and abroad,this paper studies the manufacture's service subsidies' influence on the optimal price and service decision-making and the profits in a supply chain that consists of two manufactures and a common retailer.The main research conments and conclusions are as follows:1)This paper studies the influence of the service subsidies that under the Stackelberg game that dominated by the manufacture on the wholesale price,service level,retail price,market demand,retailer's profits and the manufacture's profit.The research shows that providing service subsidies always lead to damage the manufacture's profit and if there is no suitable profit allocation mechanism,manufactures have no incentive to provide service subsidies.This paper uses the Nash bargaining model in order to increase the profits of both the retailer and the manufactures by allocating the extra profit that brought by the service subsidies.2)This paper studies the influence of the service subsidies that under the Nash equilibrium game that dominated by the manufacture on the wholesale price,service level,retail price,market demand,retailer's profits and the manufacture's profit.The research shows that the service subsidies that the manufacture provides to the retailer can increase the wholesale price,service level,retail price and market demand.The service subsudies will increase as the service subsidies coefficient increases,but the retailer's profits and the manufacture's profit does not necessarily increase.Only the service subsidies coefficient satisfies certain conditions,can it achieve the goal of increasing profits.
Keywords/Search Tags:supply chain, service subsidies, manufacture, retailer, Nash bargaining model
PDF Full Text Request
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