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Research On The Relationship Between Two-way Capital Occupation, Corporate Governance And Investment Efficiency

Posted on:2017-03-01Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y FuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330503488672Subject:Management Science and Engineering
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Investment decision is the most important financial decision in the modern enterprise for the reason that the level of the investment decision affects enterprises' capital inventory, value and survival directly. In C hina, listed companies usually exist problems considering inefficient investment, that to a certain extent impede further transition and development of China's economy. Based on the fact that actual investment efficiency of most companies deviates expected optimal investment level, the academic world does a lot of researches and studies as well as makes lots of achievements.In C hina, the concentrative equity structure of listed companies provides major stockholders with opportunities to make investment decisions to control the company. By direct or indirect ways to occupy capital of listed companies, lots of major stockholders utilize their positions to actualize the tunneling behavior to make profits for themselves, which diminish the value of listed companies, the interest of small and medium sized stock holders as well as reducing the investment efficiency. Additionally, listed companies not only exist behaviors like major stockholders occupying capitals of companies, but also exist behaviors like listed companies occupying capitals of major stockholders. In other words, the occupation of funds is bidirectional. Regarding the bidirectional occupation of funds and influences of the corporation governance this article discusses the possibility on improving companies' investment efficiency systematically, which avoids the one-sidedness of unilateral research to a certain extent.Based on the related literatures of domestic and abroad, this article uses 5,624 observed data of 1,406 listed companies from 2011 to 2014 as efficient research samples, and adopting the Richardson(2006) model as the measurement of companies' investment efficiency. This model uses the net amount of occupied funds to measure the bidirectional occupation of funds. This article verified the influence of bidirectional occupation of funds for the investment efficiency empirically, and analyzed the effect o f the corporation governance on the investment efficiency and restriction of the bidirectional occupation of funds. From the research, the correlation of the investment efficiency with the net amount of occupation of funds of related parties like major stockholders is negative. The correlation of the investment efficiency with the net amount of occupation of funds of listed companies is negative, and the effect is not significant. The correlation of the investment efficiency with the occupation of listed co mpanies' funds by related parties is positive. The correlation of corporation governance with the investment efficiency is positive. Board leadership structure, board of supervisors scale, the proportion of the largest shareholder of the board of directors have no significant restrict impact on the investment efficiency and bidirectional occupation of funds. The effect of the proportion of independent directors on restraining the relationship of the investment efficiency and bidirectional occupation of funds is not significant. The correlation of stock ownership restriction with the investment efficiency is positive. To improve companies' investment efficiency further, this article believes that the country should accelerate development of the split-share reform and advance the equity structure of listed companies to avoid the dominance share issues as well as keep the equity balance of major stockholders. The government should increase the information disclosure of related transactions of listed companies, and intensify the supervision and punishment of improper related transactions of major stockholders to restrain the tunneling behavior of major stockholders. This article also thinks that the enterprise should pay attention to play the role of independent directors, independent directors, to establish and improve the normative mechanism to creative investment opportunities, which follow the principle of Pareto Optimality and the corporate value maximization and finally improve the investment efficiency of enterprises.
Keywords/Search Tags:Bidirectional capital impropriation, corporate governance, investment efficiency
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