Research On The Relationship Between Corporate Governance And Investment Efficiency From The Perspective Of Agency Problem

Since the reform and opening up in 1978,China has experienced high-speed economic growth,and investment is the important driving force to support economic growth.However,the long-term excessive investment also produces the problem of inefficient investment,which needs to be studied from the micro level to restrain over investment and improve investment efficiency.The agency problem between shareholders and managers and between large shareholders and small shareholders will lead to inefficient investment behavior.Corporate governance mechanism is an important mechanism to alleviate agency problems and restrain inefficient investment effectively.There are close links among agency problem,corporate governance and investment efficiency.This paper discusses the influence of corporate internal governance on investment efficiency from the perspective of agency cost intermediary effect in theory,,and quantitatively investigates the relationship between corporate governance and investment efficiency using the data of listed manufacturing companies in China.Firstly,drawing to the theory of mediation effect,this paper puts forward a model of mediation effect of corporate internal governance on investment efficiency.It considers that corporate internal governance affects investment efficiency through agency cost,reveals the intermediary path of corporate internal governance on investment efficiency,and puts forward research hypothesis based on theoretical analysis.There is a positive correlation between agency cost and inefficient investment,and a negative correlation between agency cost and investment efficiency.Corporate internal governance influences inefficient investment and investment efficiency through agency cost.The higher the level of corporate internal governance,the lower the agency cost,thereby restraining inefficient investment and improving investment efficiency.Secondly,the intermediary effect model is constructed to empirically test the impact of corporate internal governance on investment efficiency and the intermediary effect of agency cost on the impact of corporate internal governance on investment efficiency.The main empirical conclusions are as follows: corporate governance level has a significant impact on over-investment,agency cost plays an intermediary role in the impact of corporate internal governance on over-investment.The higher the corporate internal governance level,the lower the agency cost,effectively restrain over-investment,and improve investment efficiency;corporate governance level has no significant impact on underinvestment,agency cost does not play a mediating role in the impact of corporate governance on underinvestment;the results of subregional mediating effect test show that agency cost in eastern region plays a mediating role in the impact of corporate governance on overinvestment,but the intermediary effect of agency cost in central and Western regions is not significant,the intermediary effect of agency cost in the eastern,central and western regions on the impact of corporate governance on underinvestment is not significant.