| It is commonly believed that China's reform has entered a deep water zone since 2004.In 2013,the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform proposed to actively develop the mixed-ownership economy.At the same time,attention should also be paid to protecting the interests of investors,both state-owned assets from loss and the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors,so as to promote the healthy and orderly development of the capital market and the development of the national economy.The development of capital market is the basis of one country's economic development,and investor protection is beneficial for the constant development of capital market.In this time,the aim of mixed ownership reform is improving the competitiveness of state-owned enterprise and activating the capital market.So investor protection can activate the development of capital market and national economy.Under the process of mixed ownership reform,state-owned enterprise takes advantage of market mechanism and absorbs non-state-owned capital,and then the control allocation is different.What is the influence under this case? So,this paper researches the relationship of the difference in control allocation and investor protection in the context of mixed ownership reform on the statistics of 2014-2018 in Shanghai Stock Exchange.This paper consists of five parts.The first part is introduction,which mainly introduces the research background,research signification,and sorts out relevant domestic and foreign literature,and then under the theoretical basis ensures the orientation of this paper,and at the same time introduces the ideas,framework structure and innovation points of this paper.The second part is the definition of mixed ownership reform and the control allocation.It also introduces the relevant theories of investor protection,information asymmetry,principal-agent,super property,equity balance.The third part is about research design.First,in the conclusion of the process to mixed ownership reform,the paper analyses the status of control power and investor protection on the statistics of 2014-2018 in Shanghai Stock Exchange.Then,under the theoretical analysis,the paper puts forward hypothesis.Finally,the paper uses the statistics of 2014-2018 in Shanghai Stock Exchange about reforming state-owned enterprises,and designs relevant model to test the hypothesis.The fourth part is the research results.After receiving the results of model,the paper continues the robust test to ensure the reliability of the results.The fifth part is the research conclusion,and then put forwards suggestions,points out the deficiencies and prospects.The conclusions of this paper are as follows: in the enterprises of implementing mixed ownership reform,the ownership concentration has positive impact on the investor protection,and the ownership balance has negative impact on the investor protection,and the ownership of the institutional investor has positive impact on the investor protection.The innovations of this paper may lies in the research of mixed ownership reform main concentrates on the relationship of reforming and operating performance,growth,innovation ability,innovation efficiency,and so on.This paper researches the relationship of the difference in control allocation and investor protection in the context of mixed ownership reform.It is innovative in research perspective and contents.This paper has some realistic meanings: on the one hand,it is useful for the state-owned enterprise optimizes the control allocation,and promotes setting the mechanism of investor protection.On the other hand,suggesting the state-owned enterprise how to protect the investor in the process of mixed ownership reform,it is helpful to us to understand the policy of mixed ownership reform and fast the process of mixed ownership reform. |
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