Discrete First Price Click Auction Mechanism Design

The rapid development of Internet technology has led to the innovation and development of the traditional advertising industry.According to the IAB 2016 report,Internet advertising revenue in 2015 reached $ 59.6 billion,while the search advertising accounted for 43%.The huge commercial gains have led to the rapid development of scientific research.Instead of allocating slots to the advertisers,like that did by popular mechanisms such as VCG,GFP and GSP,DFCA aims to properly manage all the slots by itself and allocate CTRs to the advertisers.This idea is actually motivated from the work on spectrum auction that weakens the concept of slots and adds up the CTRs of all the slots,and then assigns appropriate CTRs according to advertisers'bids.Then the DFCA model and VCG model are simulated by Yahoo! Webscope auction data,and experimental results show that the DFCA model exists only one equilibrium and effectively allocates social resources and maximize social welfare.Our work in this paper consists of four parts:(1)An improved model DFCA is designed for the shortcomings of the FCA model.Each advertiser's submitted bid is segmented and can only be paid at a specified price.The allocation mechanism is changed from the bid to the payment.(2)The characteristics of the FCA model are demonstrated by the features of the DFCA model,such as the characteristics of bids on FCA linear model and FCA quadratic model.(3)Using the auction data on the Yahoo Research website,we simulated the bids of the FCA linear,FCA quadratic and FCA cubic models and the VCG model,then compared the advertising slots on the different numbers with three evaluation indicators(SW,PA,POA).It is proved that the FCA model is superior to the VCG model in the allocation of social resources.(4)Then the experimental results show that in the case of little impact on the social resources,the DFCA model is more likely to reach the equilibrium state than the FCA model.