Research On Multi-attribution Reverse Auction Mechanism Design

The development of internet economy pushes Electronic Commerce widely used, E-Procurement is an effective method for companies to save cost and develop efficiency.Recently,multi-attribute reverse auction(MRAT)has been adopted in E-Procurement by lots of companies.This new procurement method has not a tendency;it has been a part of modern commerce.But,in general,competitive bidding on internet has a common characteristic,which is adopting single dimensionality(usually price) consultation basely,without thinking about other factors.However,E-Procurement should be consulted with Multi-attribution, including price.So Multi-attribution Reverse Auction Mechanism comes into being.It might be a research hotspot and application model of E-Procurement.Therefore, Research on Multi-attribution Reverse Auction Mechanism Design has an important meaning.Basing on this background,the thesis tries to research the theory and method of Multi-attribution Reverse Auction Mechanism Design deeply.Firstly,the thesis introduces auction mechanism design's basic theory,and summarize related notion of Multi-attribution Reverse Auction Mechanism;then review document on Multi-attribution Reverse Auction Mechanism from two angles:auction mechanism design and Multi-attribution Reverse Auction,in order to supply theoretical support of the item.Next,the thesis obtains two-round Multi-attribution Reverse Auction Mechanism,as well as explains its implement flow,strong poin,v/eak point and the essential difference with the traditional ones.Secondly,to conduct the first round auction mechanisms design.In order to control the break of engagement,the thesis establishes various kinds of systems,such as security money system,guarantee system and base price publish system.Then establish credit evaluation system of supplier.Choosing eight indexes which can reach in the internet,meanwhile using expert advice method to obtain determine matrices and AHP method to obtain every indicator weight.Next employing satisfaction degree function method,construct satisfaction degree function u_i,calculate membership grade functionη,multiply membership grade function by indicator weight function to get the result of fuzzy synthesize judge.When the result is beyond a reasonable quality and credit degree threshold,we think the supplier can enter next auction round.Thirdly,to enter the second round auction mechanisms design.In advance,the thesis provide ordinary model of Multi-attribution Reverse Auction Mechanism,then formulate other properties as a property excluding price.The thesis analysis two-dimension auction mechanism in detail,at the same tine proves optimality two-dimension auction mechanism's rationality and no sphere.Following,discussing three-dimension auction mechanism design,in premise of optimality benefit formula, enplaning its implement step.Finally,the thesis chooses an example to do the demonstrative research. Purchasing agent carries out two-round Multi-attribution Reverse Auction Mechanism, picks out trading object successfully,and achieves approximate optimality auction result at the end.The thesis study on Multi-attribution Reverse Auction Mechanism Design makes procurement pattern better.The innovation of this thesis is not only considering numerical problem,but also non-numerical problem.So the model is more in accordance with actual need,and receiving wider application.Simultaneously,to integrate two-dimension auction mechanism,the thesis provides optimality three-dimension auction mechanism design of E-Procurement.To apply this method to Multi-attribution Auction definitely can get using value.