Management Power,Property Right And Expense Stickiness

Expense stickiness is one of the hotspots of academia,it reflects that costs rise more when the volume of business increases than they decrease when sales falls.So,is cost stickiness a prevalent phenomenon?How does the viscosity keep?Is cost stickiness a tool for managers to adjust to their own interests?This prompt us to study expense stickiness gradually,because it not only reveals the management manipulation of behavior,but also set up a bridge between financial accounting and management accounting.At present,the academic community generally agreed that the agency problem can better explain the cost stickiness.Because of the agency relationship,the manager always chase the objective of maximizing their own interests.So expense stickiness may be an arbitrary tool which manager can adjust it to their own interests.Many scholars began to investigate whether the manager deliberately make the expense sticker?From all aspects of self-serving motives,profit-keeping motive,the motive of defection,the expansion of motivation,overconfidence,many scholars investigate whether the characters of manager affect expense stickiness.Montesquieu has said:all unbridled power must lead to corrupt.The greater the power management has,the more easy for manager to avoid the internal corporate governance mechanism and the external supervision of the company.The management of self-interest motives more easily translated into practical action.Presently,the academic community generally believe that management power will bring a series of agency problems such as over-investment,on-the-job consumption,earnings management,financial restatement.Scholars have gradually found management power was affected by "public power".The rent-seeking way also shifted from self-determined remuneration to earnings management and over-investment.However,few studies have studied whether managerial power affects cost stickiness.Because management has a certain discretion and it is difficult for corporate governance mechanism to implement effective supervision.Expense stickiness verifies management's manipulation of cost and scholars can explore managers' behavior on the basis of this clue.So this paper directly studies the management power and expense stickiness in order to find the evidence of management using power rent-seeking in management accounting.After the theoretical analysis,this paper selects the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed manufacturing companies as the research sample.Research methods includes empirical analysis and normative analysis,and we have empirical tests for the following three major issues:firstly,whether expense stickiness is prevalent in Chinese manufacturing listed companies?Secondly,what is the influence of management power on expense stickiness?Thirdly,what is the interaction of management authority and expense stickiness in different nature of property?At last,we draw three conclusions:(1)The expense of manufacturing listed companies in China is sticky;(2)The management authority significantly increased costs stickiness,and the greater power the manager has,the greater expense stickiness turns to be;(3)According to the nature of the actual controller,we separate listed companies into non-state-owned companies and state-owned companies.We found that management power promotes more apparent viscosity in non-state-owned companies compared with state-owned companies.Accordingly,this paper raises some proper suggestions including improving the manager evaluation system and wakening management power in order to reduce management agency cost and boost enterprise development.