The Financing Risk And Model Research Based On Electronic Order Financing In Supply Chain

Small and medium-sized enterprise(SME)occupies an important position in national economy.But the key factor restricting their own development is the financing difficulty.With the rapid development of the Internet,especially the implementation of “Internet +” strategy,it provides a new solution for solving the financing dilemma of SME.The bank jointly with the third-party B2 B e-commerce platform to offer supply chain financial services is an important vehicle to promote financial innovation and business innovation.The China Construction Bank which cooperated with the JYD,the Dun Huang net and other well-known Chinese B2 B e-commerce platform,launched a series of online supply chain financial service products,such as electronic warehouse financing,electronic order financing.With the characteristics of “small amount,timeliness,high frequency and unsecured”,electronic order financing mainly provide financial services for supply chain downstream enterprise,and it is one of the main pattern in online supply finance area.Therefore,how to carry out the electronic order financing services to solve the financing difficulty of SME based on e-commerce platform,becoming an urgent problem on mode evolution of online supply chain finance in current academia.This thesis researched the financing mode and financing tactics of the electronic order financing service by the method of literature summary,principal-agent,bi-level Stackelberg game and numerical analysis.Firstly,comprehensive analysis of the two typical electronic order supply chain financing modes(entrusted supervision and unified credit)was made in this thesis,which was based on whether the e-commerce platform directly or indirectly participates into the financing service.The thesis designed the incentive tactics between bank and the e-commerce platform,and constructed principal-agent model by taking the moral hazards of the e-commerce platform as analysis point.Secondly,based on the bankruptcy of SME,the decision model of each participant in electronic order financing under entrusted supervision and unified credit pattern were constructed through the bi-level Stackelberg game.the optimal strategies of each participant under these decision models were obtained,these tactics provided a theoretical basis for the banks to develop tactics in electronic order financing business.Finally,the thesis applied numerical calculation to deep analyze the relevant proposition between entrusted supervision and unified credit pattern by Matlab.It directly reflected the trends of relevant parameters.The study of incentive mechanism,game mechanism and financing tactics in electronic order financing model were conducted in this thesis,which put forward effective measures for financing strategies and risk control.Meanwhile,the thesis provided a theoretical guide to optimize the financing process of SME,and for the bank to develop electronic order financing services efficiently respectively.