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Research On Pricing Policy Of B2C Platforms

Posted on:2018-05-11Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330515484306Subject:Industrial engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,with the development of Internet technology and the popularity of smart phones,E-commerce has been rapidly developed.Online shopping has become a new way of consumption.As online shopping goes prevalent,people's standards of shopping quality are also rising.And that's why the B2C E-commerce which can provide high-quality service has gradually gone beyond the traditional C2C E-commerce to become a new option for consumers.In reality,the operating models of B2C E-commerce can be divided into three ones,namely merchant model,two-sided platform model and mixed model.By making comparisons among these three,the paper supports that the two-sided platform model will become the leading one in the future.So,setting companies with two-sided platform as research object,the paper explores to study the pricing strategy of B2C E-commerce platforms mainly from the aspects of monopoly and duopoly.Based on the cross-group networking externality and multi-homing of Armstrong,the author comes up with the concept of matching rate of two relevant platforms.In addition to studying impacts of the externality and multi-homing on pricing of B2C E-commerce platforms,the paper also probes into the impacts matching rate has on pricing of E-commerce platforms.In Chapter One,the author introduces the background and significance of this research.Chapter Two mainly presents the literature review about two-sided market pricing and elaborates characteristics of two-sided market of B2C E-commerce.Chapter Three studies the several factors that will affect the pricing of B2C E-commerce platforms under the situation of monopoly.The study shows:1)the platform's pricing for two-sided users and the size of the user's access depend on the size of the cross-group network externality;2)the profit of the platform is proportional to the successful matching of two platforms.Chapter Four focuses on the duopoly competition.Firstly,the situation of single-homing was researched.The study shows:1)the platform's pricing for two-sided users depends on the size of the cross-network externality;2)the two symmetric competitive platforms are inversely proportional to the successful matching rate of two-sided users.Then the situation of multi-homing was studied.The result reveals:1)the platform's pricing for two-sided users depends on the size of the cross-network externality;2)with the successful matching rate upgrading,the profit of the platform rises at the beginning and then falls.Finally,when comparing different accessing models,the author finds that:1)At first,cross-group network externality is not very strong,single-homing platform's profit is relatively large.As cross-group network externality improves,multi-homing becomes more and more favorable.2)At first,the successful matching rate is relatively low,single-homing platform's profit is relatively large.As the successful matching rate improves,multi-homing becomes more and more favorable.Chapter Five is the summary of the whole thesis,and the deficiency of this research as well as future direction of it.
Keywords/Search Tags:two-sided market, cross-group network externality, single-homing, partial multi-homing, successful matching rate
PDF Full Text Request
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